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Abstract: 
The first decade of the 21
th 
century witnessed dramatic changes all over the 
world amounting to a global political, economic and social transformation. In effect, 
new actors in world politics adapted to the new conditions and learnt lessons from 
previous experiences and the overthrow of decades of suppression. Turkey’s rise is 
one of the most impressive cases in this century with developments at various levels, 
particularly economic and political, coinciding with critical global economic and 
political processes. Development was achieved under the rule of a newly formed 
political party with an Islamist background that was able to gain the Turkish voters’ 
trust in three successive elections.  
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is the main focus of this 
research, placing it in the context of history and of contemporary developments that 
facilitated this unique case. An analysis of the shift in the mentality and self- 
definition of the new party whose members are labeled Islamists is important as this 
was due to a long learning and adaptation process that led to a more mature 
understanding of the rules of the political game. The question of the collective identity 
of Turkey and the Turks conditioned the dramatic turn of events, notably in the field 
of foreign policy.  
The thesis thus highlights the main milestones which Turkey went through 
under the AKP and tests prevailing stereotyped thinking concerning Islamists parties 
in the case of Turkey specifically. 
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 :ملخص عن الدراسة
أنحاء العالم على كافة  شهد العقد الأول من القرن الحادي والعشرين تغييرات جذرية طالت جميع
وعلى أثره، شهد العالم دخول فاعلين جدد إلى الساحة . النواحي بما فيها السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية
السياسية العالمية حيث تمكنوا من التأقلم مع الوضع العالمي الجديد و أخذ العبر من التجارب السابقة منهين 
لتجربة التركية هي من أبرز التجارب المثيرة للاهتمام في القرن الجديد ا. بذلك عقود من الاضطهاد و الكبت
والاقتصادي بالرغم من الأزمات  سياسيحيث شهدت صعوداً مميزاً على كافة المستويات و تحديداً في المجال ال
محط   التركي في العقد الأخير بروزما يجعل ال أهملعل و. الاقتصادية والسياسية التي عصفت بالعالم كله
للاهتمام هو تزامن هذا البروز مع صعود حزب سياسي جديد ذو جذور إسلامية تمكن من حصد أكبر نسبة من 
 .أصوات و ثقة الناخبين الأتراك على مدار ثلاث دورات انتخابية متتالية
إن صعود حزب العدالة والتنمية هو المحور الرئيسي لهذه الدراسة آخذين بعين الاعتبار السياق 
اريخي والتطورات المعاصرة التي لعبت دوراً في تشكل هذه الحالة الفريدة من نوعها حيث سيتم تحليل الت
والذي معاده " بالإسلاميين" التحول في العقلية و الهوية الذاتية للحزب الجديد الذي لطالما وصف أعضاءه 
اسي للحزب ليصبح أكثر درايةً بقواعد عملية طويلة من التعلم والتأقلم والذي بدوره أسهم في النضوج السي إلى
بالإضافة إلى ذلك، لعبت مسألة الهوية الجمعية لتركيا و الأتراك  دورا ًرئيسيا ًفي التحول الذي . اللعبة السياسية
 .شهدته تركيا خاصة في مجال السياسة الخارجية
الة والتنمية مختبرين إن الدراسة تسلط الضوء على الأحداث الفارقة في تركيا  في ظل حكم حزب العد
 .بذلك الأفكار النمطية السائدة حول الأحزاب الإسلامية متمثلة في الحالة التركية على وجه التحديد
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction:  
  The great diversity of Turkey opens the appetite of researchers from different 
backgrounds to analyze and understand its rising strategic position in the 21
th
 century, 
having in mind its long history and critical geographical and cultural position at the 
crossroads of two widely different continents. The historical shift from the Ottoman 
religious state to a civil, secular one under Kemal Ataturk obliged Turkey for decades 
to face the question of its collective identity, a matter that has shaped attitudes 
domestically and internationally. Any identity other than the secular one has been 
suppressed since the creation of modern Turkey, something seen as essential in order 
to protect Turkey’s security from any threat either internal or external.  
The domestic situation in Turkey went through many milestones since the 
beginning of the 21
th
 century including the increasing role of new actors such as the 
Islamic elite and civil society, most crucially the economic crisis that affected the 
entire world. Turkish policies as well as voting, in particular, were decisively affected. 
One of the main milestones in Turkish policies in the last decade was the 
success of a newly established political party with an Islamic background and its 
impressive capability to challenge the military institution that claims to be the 
protector of secularism in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which 
entered the Turkish political arena in 2002, impressed the world just as it was able to 
impress Turkish citizens with its achievements in term of putting Turkey on a 
pioneering position at different levels especially in the field of economy and foreign 
policy. 
This study thus aims to analyze the rapid process of change that Turkey 
witnessed during the last decade as well as associated factors and implications. It 
xi 
 
 
 
reconsiders and investigates prior concepts concerning the lack of openness of 
political Islam based on the Turkish model. It highlights relations between 
constitutional secularism and political Islam and how these contradictions were 
managed through the rule of the AKP as well as examining the strategic role in the 
region played by Turkey since the turn of the century.  
The study will try to provide an answer to a main question: How were a 
fundamental openness and change in the Turkish domestic and foreign policy 
achieved, in spite of the rise of an Islamic political party? Our hypothesis that 
prevailing ideas are mistaken in categorizing Islamist parties as necessarily more rigid 
and less open on the economic and political levels than the secular parties that are 
supposed to be closer to the Western ideas of openness. Turkish reality, which will be 
the subject of the thesis, seems to show that the change in domestic and foreign 
policies coincided with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and 
could not in fact have been achieved in the era of secular parties. We will attempt to 
answer the question why this may have been so. It is thus a test of dominant academic 
assessments regarding the role of political Islam, limited to a particular case. 
This analytical and comparative study is to be based principally on secondary 
sources interpreting the evolution of Turkish politics and policies, most notably 
articles, books, and other academic research, but not excluding official documents, 
reports, statements, speeches, and political programs. 
The first chapter is based on the failure of social scientists to predict, and now 
to explain, the dramatic transformation that has taken place in a single decade in 
Turkey’s domestic and international position. It will provide a theoretical background 
to the thesis which will focus mainly on constructivism as the approach best able to 
explain the change process in Turkish domestic and foreign policy under the AKP. 
This section will provide background on the development of constructivism in the 
field of international relations and its main assumption as well as its variables in 
foreign policy analysis. As adaptation and learning are among the main concepts 
adopted by constructivists, this section will also highlight the changing factors within 
a party which include environmental factors (political opportunities, electoral 
incentives, and structure of competition)  and internal factors within the party itself ( 
the historical legacy and the dynamics of transition).   
     The second chapter Political Islam in Turkey will provide a historical 
background of modern Turkey after Ataturk’s reforms and the entrance of political 
Islam into political life moving to the Welfare Party and the evolution of the AKP. 
The third chapter The AKP’s New Discourse will highlight that party’s published 
program and analyze the differences between its program and that of its predecessors, 
complemented by an analysis of the election results of 2002, 2007 and 2011. The 
fourth chapter The AKP in Office introduces economic developments under the 
governance of the AKP as well as the Turkish foreign policy pursued during the last 
decade. The research will be concluded with a section that summarizes the 
researcher’s arguments and findings. 
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I. CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 As constructivist theory will be the research base for this case study, it would be 
useful to get into the theory’s details and concepts aiming to have a clearer image about a 
distinctive approach in international relations analysis. This chapter presents the social 
constructivist theory of international relations as well as its development, main 
assumptions, unit of analysis, constructivist scholars, and their view of foreign policy 
analysis. The chapter will also present the changing factors within a party in terms of 
environmental factors and internal ones. 
 
I.1.The Development of Constructivism: 
 By the late 1980s the constructivist approach had entered international relations 
theory especially in North America. The historical context represented by the end of the 
Cold War, followed by the theoretical discussions between international relations 
scholars especially among neorealist’s and liberals helped to set the stage for the 
constructivist approach. This approach was less widespread in Europe as the concept of 
an international society prevalent there had to a limited extent included the role of ideas 
and the importance of social interaction between states in their analysis. Therefore, there 
was less space for the constructivist approach there.
1
 
 Constructivism was inspired by other theorists in social science such as Anthony 
Giddens who proposed the concept of structuration: 
                                                          
1
 - Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 
3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 161. 
  “According to Giddens, structures (the rules and conditions that guide social action) 
do not determine what actors do in any mechanical way which might be the view of 
neorealist’s regarding the structure of anarchy which constrains state actors. Structures do 
constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and 
acting on them in new ways. The notion of structuration therefore leads to a less rigid and 
more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and actors. IR constructivists 
use this as a starting-point for suggesting a less rigid view of anarchy.”2  
 Nicholas Onuf is credited with coining the term "constructivism" in order to 
describe approaches to the study of world politics that emphasize the socially constructed 
character of international relations. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, constructivism 
has thus become one of the major schools of thought within international relations.
3
 
I.2 Constructivist Theory: 
 This section will introduce constructivism as a mix of both social theories and 
international relations theories: 
I.2.1.The Social Theory: 
 In social theory, human relations including international relations are made of ideas 
and thoughts and not simply material conditions or forces. According to constructivism 
the social world is not fixed or given: it is not something ‘out there’ that exists 
independently of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it. It is not an external 
reality whose regulations can be discovered through scientific research and explained by 
                                                          
2
 -Ibid. 
3
 -Ibid, 166. 
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scientific theory as positivists and behavioralists argue. The social world is a world of 
human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and 
discourses, of signs, signals and understandings among human beings, especially groups 
of human beings such as states and nations. The social world is an intersubjective 
domain: it is valuable to people who made it and live in it, and who understand it very 
well because they made it and they are at home in it.
4
 
 The main emphasis of social constructivism is on intersubjective beliefs (and ideas, 
conceptions and assumptions) that are widely shared among people. Ideas must be widely 
shared in order to matter; nonetheless they can be held by different groups, such as 
organizations, policymakers, social groups or society. The social constructivist view of 
ideas can be shown by the following quotations: 
“The claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are 
autonomous from power and interest. The claim is rather that power and interest have the 
effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. Power and interest explanations 
presuppose ideas, and to that extent are not rivals to ideational explanations at all.”5 
 "The starting premise is that the ideational view held by social constructivists’ ideas 
always matter; the material world is indeterminate and is interpreted within a larger 
context of meaning. Ideas thus define the meaning of material power.”6 
                                                          
4
 - Ibid, 162. 
5
- Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 531-136. 
6- Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29. 4 
(Spring 2005):19.  
  “Ideas are mental constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, 
principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behavior and policy.”7 
          I.2.2 Constructivism and International Relations  
Political realism has dominated international relations theory for a long time 
especially in the post-World War II era due mostly to the emergence of the Cold War. 
However, realism has been criticized frequently during the last few decades, and liberals 
have been the major participants in the critiques against realism. As Alexander Wendt 
puts it: 
“…the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is 
influenced by 'structure' (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus 'process' 
(interaction and learning) and institutions.” 8 
                                                          
7
 -Ibid, 15. 
8
 -Quoted in Yokel Bozdaglioglu. Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 3 
 
 
 
9 
– Ibid 
10
 - Nilüfer Karacasulu and Elif Uzgören," Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security 
Studies." Perceptions XII (summer – autumn 2007): 29. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/KaracasuluUzgoren.pdf Accessed 2- 10- 2010. 
11
 - - Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, 160. 
5 
 
 
 
In addition, constructivists had something new to say as they joined the debate 
believing that the cause of state egoism does not always justify treating it as given. They 
argue that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than 
material; and these structures form actors' identities and interests. They suggest that 
collective identity could emerge normally at the systemic level, a process that would 
generate cooperation.
9
 
 Constructivism is not itself a theory of IR, but a theoretically informed approach to 
the study of international relations, which depends on the perception that international 
relations are ‘socially constructed’.10 Social constructivism emphasizes human ideas, 
beliefs and consciousness. They argue that the most important aspect in international 
relations is social rather than material as the international system is constituted by ideas, 
not by material forces. In particular, the international system is a set of ideas, a body of 
thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular 
time and place. However, the international relations system itself will change if the 
thoughts and ideas that enter into international relations change because the system 
consists of thoughts and ideas.
11
 
Constructivism seeks to demonstrate how many basic aspects of international 
relations are, contrary to the assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism, socially 
constructed, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and 
                                                          
 
 
 
interaction. Thus, Alexander Wendt says of two increasingly accepted basic beliefs of 
constructivism: 
 (1) That the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared 
ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.
12
 
For neorealists, identities and interests are given; states know who they are and 
what they need before they start interaction with other states. For constructivists, it is the   
interaction with others that form one structure of identities and interests instead of 
another. States need to survive and be secure; neorealists and constructivists agree about 
that. Constructivists argue that we can only find out the security policy that follows 
through studying identities and interests as they are shaped in interactions between 
states.
13
 
Simply put, constructivists believe that while thoughts and ideas that enter into 
the existence of international relations change, then the system itself can be changed as 
well, because the system consists of thoughts and ideas. Thus, change becomes possible 
in a big way because people and states can start thinking about each other in new ways 
and thus form new norms that may be very different from old ones.
14
 
                                                          
12
 - Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 1. 
13
 - Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, 167. 
14
 -Ibid, 160. 
7 
 
 
 
I.2.3.The main assumptions of constructivism:
15
 
 First of all, according to constructivists, the international system is a system of ideas 
and norms which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place. 
Human agents construct social reality and reproduce it in their daily practices. Thus, 
constructivism sees the international system as ‘socially constructed’ and not given.  
 
 Secondly, constructivists argue that agents do not exist independently of their social 
environment. Thus, state interests emerge from an environment in which states operate 
and are endogenous to states’ interaction with their environment. The social world 
involves thoughts, beliefs, ideas, concepts, languages, discourses, signs and signals. 
People make the social world, which is meaningful in the minds of people. In other 
words, constructivists believe that the social environment defines who we are, our 
identities as social beings. In addition, normative or ideational structures do not exist 
independently from the social environment. Constructivists focus both on differences 
among people and how those relations are formed by means of collective social 
institutions.  
 
 Thirdly, constructivists emphasize the importance of normative or ideational 
structures as well as material structures in defining the meaning and identity of an 
individual. According to constructivists, human beings interpret the material 
environment. For example, the international system of security and defense consists of 
                                                          
15
 - Nilüfer Karacasulu-Elif Uzgören, Explaining Social, 32-33. 
territories, populations, weapons and other physical assets. But the important thing is how 
these material resources are conceived, organized and used in international security. In 
addition, constructivists stress inter-subjective beliefs such as ideas, and assumptions.  
 Finally, according to constructivism, norms and shared beliefs constitute an actor’s 
identities and interests, e.g. the way people conceive themselves in their relation with 
others. Constructivists concentrate on the social identities and interests of actors. Social 
identities and interests are not fixed but relative and relational. Interests are based on the 
social identities of actors. Constructivist analysis redefines the concepts of roles, rules, 
identity and ideas, considerably departing from rational choice conceptualizations.  
 
I.2.4. Challenging Neorealism: 
Because neorealism was dominant during constructivism's formative period, much of 
constructivism's first theoretical work concentrates on challenging certain basic neorealist 
assumptions. Neorealists are fundamentally structuralists, and international politics is 
explained by the structure of the international system, a position first advanced in 
Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State and War and fully clarified in his core text of neorealism, 
Theory of International Politics. In particular, international politics is primarily 
determined by the fact that the international system is anarchic - it lacks any 
comprehensive authority, instead it is composed of units (states) which are formally equal 
- they are all sovereign over their own territory. This anarchy, neorealists argues, forces 
States to act in certain ways, they have to “Self-help” which means they can rely on no-
one but themselves for security. The way in which anarchy forces them to act in such 
ways, to defend their own self-interest in terms of power, explains most of international 
9 
 
 
 
politics in the neorealist view. Consequently, neorealists tend to disregard explanations of 
international politics at the 'unit' or 'state' level.
16
 
 
 Constructivists argue against the neorealist claim that self- help is given by anarchic 
structure exogenously to process. Wendt argues that self-help and power politics do not 
follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if now we find ourselves in a 
self – help world this is due to process, not structure.17 
Wendt argues: “it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will 
recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, and will be revisionist or 
status quo powers, and so on.” 18 
 
 
I.2.5 Unit of Analysis: 
 The unit of analysis is individuals, especially elites, as constructivism focuses on 
the quality of interpretive activities. The individual, multi-rational human mind is 
individualistic and social, relational and collectivist. The processes of greatest interest to 
                                                          
16 - Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishing, 2005), 40 -43. 
17
 - Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46.2(1992):394. 
18
 - Ibid, 396. 
 
 
constructivists are measured through a thorough understanding of how people operate at 
the individual level.
19
  
 
I.2.6 Constructivism and Foreign Policy Analysis: 
 Constructivists thus see the surrounding world as socially constructed. 
“Constructed” in this context means that the world came into being through a process of 
interaction between agents (individuals, states, non-state actors) and the structures of 
their broader environment. For instance, in analyzing a certain foreign policy the 
constructivists don’t assume that a specific actor has certain interest but in rather they 
explore how these interests are constructed through a process of interaction with broader 
environments.
20
   
Some of the constructivists’ variables in foreign policy analysis are indicated here:  
 
 
 Identity: 
 Constructivists believe that identity plays a main role in determining both domestic 
and international politics. According to Hopfs, identities have three main functions: “they 
                                                          
19
-Emily Shaw,  “Constructivist Microfoundations: Theories and Practices of the Individual in International 
Politics"( Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian 
Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, 3-05-2005) 
20
 - Jeffrey T. Checkel. “Constructivism and foreign policy,” in Foreign Policy: Theories. Actors. Cases, Ed.  
By Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Time Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 72.  
11 
 
 
 
tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are”. 21 However, there is a 
link between identities and interests as constructivism assumes that interests imply 
choices. Moreover, the interests of states which are linked to their identities differ 
according to the historical, cultural, political and social context. In other words, the 
constructivists view interests as the result of ideas and the social construction of such 
ideas.  
22
 
 Identity offers an adequate explanation for how power is translated into threat as a 
constructivist view of identity in relation with the construction of threats: identity thus 
represents a potential source of alliance formation.
23
  
 The security of identity: 
 There is no stability in a state’s identity as identities are always open to contestation 
and some identities of some states might be less secure at a certain time than others, 
something more prevalent in pluralistic societies where the elites try to redefine their 
collective identity. Here, Constructivists link between identities and preferences as the 
implementation of a specific foreign policy may require consent and consensus among 
diverse groups that are involved in the decision making process who have various role 
identities.
24
  
                                                          
21
 - T. Hopfs, “The promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23.1 
(1998):175. 
22
 -Enver Gulseven. “Identity Security and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: Relations 
with the EU, Greece and the Middle East.” (PHD dissertation, Brunel University, 2050), 31-36. 
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/5083/1/FulltextThesis.pdf 
23
- Ibid ,40 
24
 - Ibid, 44-45. 
I.3 The Change: 
Constructivism emphasizes the process of learning and interaction in politics, 
something called political learning. This process is defined as a “change of beliefs (or the 
degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures 
as a result of observation and interpretation of experience.”25 Others broadened the 
definition by arguing that an evaluation of structure and cognitive change is essential to 
the concept of political learning. As Jack Levy put it: 
  "Learning is not a passive activity in which historical events generate their own 
lessons that actors then absorb.... Learning is an analytical construction. People interpret 
historical experience through the lens of their own analytical assumptions and 
worldviews."
26
 
In general, there are set of factors that play a role in political parties seeking for 
change and in a way or other affect the balance within a political party. These factors can 
be divided into environmental and transitional ones. 
 
I.3.1 Environmental Factors: 
                                                          
25
 - Gamze, Cavdar, “Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A model for political learning?”  Political Science 
Quarterly 121/ 3) Fall 2006(: 480. 
26
 - Ibid. 
13 
 
 
 
Environmental factors are those associated with the context in which the party 
finds itself after the onset of competitive elections. This set of factors may include 
electoral incentives, political opportunities, and competition structure.
27
 
Electoral incentives :  the constitutional features of a political system and the electoral 
rules has an influence on political parties and party systems as winning the elections 
becomes the main common goal of all competing parties . The attitude of political parties 
varies within proportional representation systems versus plurality/majority formulas or 
within presidential systems versus parliamentary systems. Scholars note that proportional 
representation systems provide the opportunity to the political party to win seats in the 
legislature without compromising to win as this system reinforces the               
“inflexibility" element of the party and more insistence on its own ideology. However, 
plurality/majority systems do not necessarily require that a party broaden its appeal to 
increase its probability of electoral success.
28
 
Political opportunities: This includes the issues which the party can exploit such as 
economic crisis and the need for economic reform, minority issues or human rights of the 
oppressed groups. Within the same political party there may be an internal clash between 
those who seek to abandon the past in light of worsening economic conditions and those 
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who view the past favorably and are far less willing than “democratic reformers” to 
compromise the party's ideological purity and to break completely with the past.
29
 
The structure of competition: the existence of different parties may exert a "squeezing 
out" effect on political parties having a common ideological space. This "squeezing out" 
effect is seen mostly in plurality electoral rule (though under other electoral rules it also 
seems to apply) when a "crowding" of competitors leads to parties that aim to 
differentiate themselves sharply in terms of policy platforms.
30
 
I.3.2 Internal factors: 
In addition to the environmental factors, the evolution of a political party is 
largely a product of a historical legacy coupled with the dynamics of particular kinds of 
transition. Thus, any kind of democratic transition affects the composition of the main 
actors especially the political parties' leaders, which affects the parties' response to any 
environmental factors they face. However, the environment doesn't cause the party to 
adapt; whether the party is able to adapt or not depends mainly on the readiness of the 
leadership to adapt.
31
 
However, the development of the leadership is a result of two integrated historical 
factors: the long-term historical experiences of each party, particularly the extent to 
which the party was compelled to reform and developed a tradition of intraparty 
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pluralism, and the particular features of each transition, especially the degree to which the 
transitional intraparty struggle was resolved in favor of the democratic reformists. 
The historical legacy: The particular history of each political party affects whether a 
tradition of internal pluralism existed or not, which in turn affects the power of the 
democratic reformist evolution within the party during the transition period.
32
 
The Dynamics of Transition: Beyond the general historical context, the extent to which 
the intraparty conflict was resolved (or not resolved) in favor of the democratic reformists 
through the transition period, around the time of the first elections, has a major impact on 
the ability of the party to adapt successfully later.
33
 
In general, many models in modern history are available in which political parties 
changed their attitudes according to the new situations their countries or the international 
system face. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist front, a series of 
parties in east-central Europe moved from enjoying a monopoly of power in single-party 
states to standing on the threshold of recognition as social-democratic parties in a context 
of competitive party politics. Some communist parties failed in adapting to the new 
global environment, whereas others managed to adapt and their parties witnessed changes 
in their programs and in their membership. The former ruling communist parties of both 
East Germany and Hungary can be taken as models of the adaptation process after 1989 
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as they witnessed the implosion of their once stable environments to find themselves as 
players in a new, uncertain and hostile political reality. 
34
 
The Turkish Islamic parties present another case in which political learning and change 
took place through decades of experience and clashes with the existing political system, 
an excellent illustration of the workings of the constructivist paradigm and the subject of 
this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY 
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II.1 Historical Background: 
Although the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were going on towards the 
modernization of the new republic founded in 1923, mainly through the adaptation of a 
secular and western lifestyle, the influence of these reforms was more tangible in the 
cities and towns than the countryside. As the Turkish population consists of a majority 
rural population, the rural and remote areas were less affected by the reforms and 
remained attached to the traditional lifestyle. Through the era of single party rule  (1923-
1950) political life in Turkey was dominated by the People Republic Party (CHP) which 
represents the Kemalist ideology and there was no room for other ideologies especially 
political Islam to emerge during this period. 
Until the 1950s, the majority of the Turkish population remained isolated and 
traditional, while the urban centers were modern and secular, leading to the existence of 
two Turkeys which coexisted in uneasy harmony: an urban, modern, secular “center” and 
a rural, traditional, religious “periphery,” with little contact between them. The dominant 
elite were urban, modern, and secular, while the greater part of the population was rural, 
traditional, and pious.
35
 
 
After the end of World WAR II, a new era of multi-party politics started in 
Turkey and specifically after the parliamentary elections of 1950 which led to the rise of 
the Democratic Party, led by Adnan Menderes, which governed for a decade. The DP 
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adopted a more flexible policy towards Islamic practices but finally faced a military 
intervention in 1960.  
II.2 The entrance of political Islam into political life: 
The Islamist movements had remained underground through the period of one- 
party rule (1923-46) during which they tried to revolt against the secular state in the 
1920s and 1930s. However, after the 1940s and the death of Ataturk the religious 
opposition embraced a nationalist discourse unlike the previous era during which the 
religious opposition considered nationalism as contradictory to the Islamic universal 
brotherhood (Umma). Moreover, the Sufi organizations and modern reformist groups 
supported this embracing of Islamic nationalist discourse at the social level which played 
a role in the creation of the social base for modern Islamist formations including the 
AKP.
36
 Not only was the opening of the political system permitting suppressed identities 
to re – emerge but a shift in collective identity was underway. This is very much in 
keeping with predictions within the constructivist paradigm. In this context, 
constructivism also stresses the interaction of individuals, elites and conditions in a given 
social formation, as fueling change in the international arena.  
One of the most significant figures in this context is Said Nursi (1876-1960) who 
has a similar influence to that of Muhammad Abduh in Egypt in term of emphasizing the 
harmony of religion and modernity. Later, the followers of Said Nursi formed the “Nurcu 
movement” that fragmented after his death into several groups. Afterwards, a figure 
called Fethullah Gülen controlled the most powerful of these groups, which saw that 
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Islam and the secularity of the state can go in parallel and stressed the connection 
between Islam, reason, science, and modernity. Gülen also stated that “Islam does not 
propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam 
establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it 
to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and 
circumstances.” These movements weren’t engaged in direct political action but their 
social actions had political implications that influenced the formation of some Islamist 
parties including the AKP later on, and the role of the pious political elites in this shift is 
apparent.
37
    
It was not until 1970 that political Islam entered the Turkish political arena openly 
with the establishment of the NVM (National View Movement) - a movement not a 
party- , known as Milli Gorus, led by Necmetin Erbakan. The movement, from which 
many Turkish Islamic leaders descend, focused on criticizing the West and 
westernization in the formation of the movement’s identity, public discourse and policies. 
It believed that the westernization of Turkish society and state, which had traditionally 
been influenced by Islam, was more serious and dangerous than the West itself. 
 The West was seen as the “other” in contrast to the “national self” in addition to 
being conceived as “the mother of all evils.”38   
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The NVM blamed the westernizers and their perception of the West as a strategic 
ally for what they considered the abandonment of “Islamic depth.” This was based on 
their belief that Turkey belongs culturally, historically and geographically to the Islamic 
world. Meanwhile, the NVM leadership adopted a discourse which distinguished between 
western culture, and modernization in the field of technology and development. “The 
emphasis on “modernization and development,” a “liberating” pre- condition from 
western hegemony remained an important feature of the NVM.”39 
In other words, the NVM’s discourse had two principal dimensions. The first was 
'spiritual development' through which the movement aimed at expanding the influence of 
Islamic values and historical roots in the society through state – controlled Islamic 
institutions and long term social policies. This was also represented in the movement's 
declared hostility towards Israel and the preference for building strategic and economic 
alliances with Islamic states. The second dimension was technological development, 
considered the main pillar of the movement as it designed a developmental plan, relying 
mainly on state and/or subsidized private enterprises, which aimed at creating a macro-
economic autarchy. 
40
 Here too, we are reminded of the strong political economy 
dimension intrinsic to constructionism, because of individuals and collective changes that 
it conditions. 
The leadership of the NVM considered the Kemalist transformation of the Islamic 
– Ottoman state and culture into a Western model as a historic mistake. Instead, they 
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aimed to establish a 'national Islamic order'. 
41
 Thus, the first Islamic party was 
established under the name of the National Order Party (MNP) in 1970, an extension of 
the NVM ideology. The party's program and public discourse stressed democratic views 
and supported freedom of conscience. However, it rejected those forms of secularism 
which could be interpreted as hostile to Islam. 
42
 
This was the first in a series of Islamic – oriented parties led by Necmettin 
Erbakan. The MNP blamed the westernization process for the fragmentation of the 
society, a matter to be treated through a policy of industrialization based on native heavy 
industry created by “Anatolian capital”. This policy was believed capable of creating a 
strong nation that would lead the Muslim World and face Western hegemony. The party 
did not last for long as it faced military intervention in 1971 for having allegedly 
infringed upon the secular nature of the state. 
43
 
After the military coup, the MNP was replaced with a new Islamic party known as 
the National Salvation Party (NSP) by a group of former members of the MNP. It 
introduced itself as the party of the urban poor and the provincial middle class, becoming 
a permanent part of the parliament during the 1970s, although far from dominant. Thus it 
succeeded in bringing Islam into the center of Turkish political life for eleven years. In 
1973, the party competed in the parliamentary elections, in which they won 11.8 % of the 
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votes and 48 seats out of 450 in the National Assembly, thus becoming the third 
parliamentary group after the Republican People’s Party and the Justice Party (successor 
of the Democratic Party).
44
    
 The NSP got its electoral support mainly from two groups: religious people and 
the needy population in Central and Eastern Anatolia. This was due to its ideology and 
propaganda that focused on moral progress relating to material and socio- economic 
progress. (See above for constructivism’s positing of an interaction between conditions 
and volition) 
The leadership of the NSP consisted mainly of lawyers and technological experts 
such as Necmettin Erbakan, who played a central role in this party as well as later 
succeeding Islamic – oriented ones. Erbakan was born in 1926, studied at Istanbul’s 
Technical University and became a professor in motor technology. He was appointed 
later deputy prime minister in a coalition government formed with the CHP (The 
Republican People’s Party) after the 1973 elections, under Bulent Ecevit. After the 
coalition collapsed, the NSP joined the National Front governments headed by Suleiman 
Demirel in 1975 and 1977.
45
 
 
During this period of the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey witnessed significant 
demographic changes characterized by the migration of villagers to the urban centers 
where the state wasn’t able to provide needed services such as housing, drinking water, 
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medical facilities, and electricity. Low income migrants built squatter housing or 
gecekondu (‘built overnight’) illegally on state land without construction permits. 46  
It was in this context that the Islamic movements as well as other political parties 
started to seek support for and from these poor urban areas. The Islamic political 
movements were succeeding in these squatter towns as they provided them with cheap or 
free social, educational and medical services. “Within the shanty towns, Islamic rites and 
teachings are reinterpreted in these new conditions to provide the cognitive means to 
understand the social and political world of an unfamiliar and unsettling urban life.”47  
In the following years, several important domestic shifts took place such as 
population growth, urbanization, economic change, and political reforms connected to the 
convergence with the EU. The underdeveloped regions in Anatolia were facing a severe 
development disparity between industrialized and rural regions leading to migration and 
population growth in urban regions in which the labor market wasn’t able to handle the 
flow of migrants. This meant high levels of hidden unemployment, given the incapacity 
of the authorities to provide basic public services. These social and economic 
developments help explain the lack of confidence of many citizens towards the state and 
its institutions.
48
 This back and forth between adaptation, change and retreat, is 
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characteristic of constructivism’s view of the process of identity, ideational, and socio-
economic transformation, and its impact on the international system. 
Although a series of economic reforms were implemented after 1982, these were 
unable at the beginning to limit inflation and the rising public debt. However, economic 
liberalization caused the growth of the private sector in contrast to the unproductive 
public sector as well as facilitating the rise of a new business class.  The religious 
movements put more effort in filling the gap caused by the inefficiency of public 
authorities, creating their own educational, social, and economic institutions and 
consequently challenging the traditional elite. In addition, foreign policy also went from 
focusing on security as a priority to placing the emphasis on economic dimensions. 
Regarding foreign policy, according to Erbakan, the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) and the World Bank were not serving the interests of Turkey but rather those of 
other countries, while damaging Turkey's sovereignty. Concerning the notion of 
international justice, the movement believed that it should defend the rights of oppressed 
nations in line with provisions of national and international protocols on human rights 
and freedoms.
49
 
The view of the NVM regarding Turkey's membership in the EU was negative. It   
believed that the EU was a Christian club and a contemporary version of Western 
imperialism. In effect, EU membership would weaken the domestic economy and make 
Turkey politically and economically dependent on the West. Any customs union would 
kill Turkey's infant industry before it was able to compete with its European rivals. In 
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addition, Turkey's membership in the EU would necessarily subject it to the decisions of 
the Christian European countries, Turkey being in the minority. The movement believed 
that the EU aimed at integrating all involved countries into European civilization, thus 
contradicting Turkey's historical, cultural and social structures.
50
 
Consequently, it was argued, Turkey should be involved in a custom union with 
Muslim States with which it shared a common historical and cultural legacy. As many 
Muslim nations in the Middle East were rich oil producing countries lacking in industrial 
development and in the production of manufacturing goods, earnings gained through the 
sale of oil would be spent on Turkish exports and thus contribute to Turkey's economic 
sustainability, with its export – oriented domestic industry. 51 
However, the movement's view on joining the EU and active membership in 
NATO changed somewhat with the establishment of the Welfare Party. As Turkey was 
looking for wider security against the Soviet threat and communism, it was also possible 
to become a member of the EU as long as it would remain as an economic entity ensuring 
equal rights and benefits to member states. Moreover, the Welfare Party (WP) constantly 
adopted an anti – Israeli foreign policy as Israel was considered the tool of the West in 
the Islamic world including Turkey.
52
 
In September 1980, the military intervened again, closing down all the political 
parties and ruling the country for three years. It prosecuted and imprisoned many of those 
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who had been involved in any socialist or Democratic Party or organization (left – wing 
politicians, intellectuals, students and artists). This gap helped the Islamists and ethnic 
Kurdish nationalists to fill the space vacated by the left (again, one notes the back and 
forth of social construction). 
53
    
At the same time “the generals who came to power on September 12, 1980 
instead of showing secular disregard for Islam , took several steps to strengthen it by 
opening new Qur’anic Schools (Kuran Kurslari), making religious courses compulsory , 
and employing new preachers (imams).”54 
Through these activities the leaders aimed at gaining legitimacy by controlling 
religion and adopting Islamic institutions and symbols which they thought would limit 
the role of political Islam in Turkish social and political life. Moreover, they believed that 
the Islamic threat would be more tolerable than the communist one. 
The leaders of the coup made use of an ideology known as the “Turkish – Islamic 
Synthesis”, formed by a group of conservative scholars in order to enhance state power. 
This ideology was represented in the Association of Intellectuals’ Heart (Aydinlar 
Ocapi), which developed an ideology combining Ottoman, Islamic and Turkish popular 
culture to legitimize the control of the new ruling elite (in this, they hearkened back to the 
type of hybrid nationalism which characterized the late Ottoman period throughout 
Anatolia and, substituting Arab for Turkish,  the Arab East). They tried to promote a new 
interpretation of the nation and state as a family and community while identifying 
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dangers to the family, state and nation posed by ideological fragmentation. Educational 
systems as well as media were used for the promotion of this ideology.
55
   
In 1982, a new constitution was promulgated and more restrictions were imposed 
on everyday life with controls on labor unions and voluntary associations as well as state 
control over media. In 1983, parliamentary elections took place and the government was 
returned to the civilians but without the participation of the old parties. It was in this year 
that that a new Islamic – oriented party was formed though not formally identifying itself 
as such.
56
 
II.3 The Welfare Party 
In 1983, then, a new party was formed by the leadership of NVM, calling itself 
the Welfare Party (WP). It was able to take part in local elections in 1984, obtaining 4.8% 
of the votes. This percentage rose to 7% in the 1987 general elections and in the 
following years it continued to grow. In the local elections of 1989 the party received 
9.8% of the votes. In early 1990s, the party’s fear of being closed down by the military as 
well as international changes led to the adaptation of a new approach in which the party’s 
leadership focused on social problems with less stress on religious themes. Poor people 
who had suffered from the liberalization policies implemented during the 1980s were the 
main target for the WP. It gained 19% of the votes in the local elections of 1994 and the 
mayorships of 28 provinces including the largest cities Ankara and Istanbul. It was in the 
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1995 general elections that the Welfare Party surprised Turkish society by receiving 21% 
of the votes and an Islamic – oriented party then came to power.57 A decisive shift in 
identity had finally occurred. 
As for the reasons of the WP success, they included both domestic and 
international developments. At the domestic level, the party managed to benefit from its 
grassroots organization that used modern methods in addition to the traditional ones. 
Moreover, it was able to attract the conservative Muslims who benefited from the 
economic liberalization process witnessed during 1980s, but were excluded from political 
life and repelled by the fragmentation and corruption of the mainstream parties as well as 
the Kurdish conflict in the southwest.
58
  
At the international level, the rejection of Turkey’s full membership application in 
1989 by the European Commission left the Turks with a feeling of exclusion from the 
West. In addition, they were increasingly disappointed by the post – Cold War 
substitution of “Islam” for the now vanished communist “enemy.” And there was a 
widespread feeling that the West was practicing a double standard when it moved against 
the killing of Muslims in Bosnia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s while following 
diplomacy of protecting the Kurds in Turkey.
59
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It can thus be seen that the WP’s success was a result of various pragmatic 
factors, among these: better services provided by the WP mayors and reduced corruption 
in the municipalities, as well as real and perceived international developments. Together, 
these elements provoked a further shift in the identity and the discourse of politics. 
However, after coming to power the WP party faced difficulties in balancing its 
promoted program with the interests of the secular establishments. The party was accused 
of pushing Turkish society towards more secular – Islamic polarity. For the secular 
establishment, the party's provocative activities such as threatening to build a mosque in 
Taksim Square, a major public transportation suburb in Istanbul, and the promotion of an 
Islamic economic grouping as an alternative to the EU which reflected an Islamic 
oriented foreign policy, led to intervention, though not directly as in 1960, 1971 and 
1980. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council handed Erbakan a list of 
recommendations to put an end to anti – secular activities. As Erbakan refused to 
implement the recommendations, he was forced to resign on June 1997. In January 1998, 
the WP was closed down and Erbakan as well as his key assistants were banned from 
politics for five years.
60
 
“Unlike the previous cases before the Court, the judgment in Refah was based not 
on the party’s statutes or program, but on various statements and symbolic public acts by 
party members of various standing (mayors, MPs, the chairman) over a six-year period. 
The Court found that these controversial statements and acts, taken as a whole, pointed to 
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a theocratic vision incompatible with democracy, which Refah would be able to realize 
through its political influence, as fundamentalists had done elsewhere.”61 
The shifting social construction was taking place, in other words, with some 
difficulty and a certain disorder, which was to be expected. 
 
 
II.4 The evolution of the AKP: 
After the closure of the WP by the Constitutional Court, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)- 
VP was established and banned after a short time. Thereafter, a split in the NVM 
occurred, leading to the formation of two parties. The first one was the Felicity Party 
(Saadet Partisi – SP) representing traditional Islamist ideas in Turkish politics. The 
second was the Justice and Development Party (AKP), founded by a group of reformists 
within the NVM led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. 
The split within the NVM surfaced When Abdullah Gul nominated himself for the 
leadership of the Virtue Party in May 2000 against the wishes of Necmettin Erbakan. Gul 
was supported by Erdogan and Arinc and he succeeded in receiving nearly half of the 
votes of delegates, representing a turning away from the traditional leadership and 
ideology. In 2001, The AKP was established where Erdogan worked to attracting 
moderate and non-Islamic personalities in order to build a wider social and political 
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base.
62
 The success of this historical development reflects the kind of transformations at 
the social, economic and cultural levels which correspond to the predictions of the 
constructivist paradigm, by way of gradual but decisive transformations with important 
effects in the international sphere.  
Erdogan and his friends describe themselves as conservative democrats, although they 
came from an Islamist political background. In an interview with the Financial Times 
published on 3 December 2004, Erdogan said the following concerning the Party’s 
identity: 
 “We are conservative democrats… our notion of conservative democracy is to attach 
ourselves to the customs, traditions, and values of our society, which is based on the 
family…This is a democratic issue, not a religious issue.” 63 
This represented a great transformation in the relationship between religion and politics. 
Erdogan expressed this relationship in an interview published by the New York Times on 
11 May 2003 as follows:  
 “A political party cannot have a religion, only an individual can… religion is so supreme 
that it cannot be politically exploited or taken advantage of.”64 
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The AKP, whose members label themselves as conservative democrats, focuses on 
human rights, civil liberties, democracy, respecting secularism, free economy, and 
abandoned the "anti- Western" discourse adopted by the WP. This followed a learning 
phase initiated among the political Islamists after the “post-modern coup” in 1997 and led 
to the appearance of the Islamist reformists who disassociated themselves from the WP's 
ideology and leaders. However, the party’s figures frequently proclaim that the new party 
is a center – right party. 
The AKP consists of individuals who joined the National Outlook Movement in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s led by Necmettin Erbakan, such as Prime Minister Erdogan, 
President of the National Assembly Bülent Arınç and the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. 
The second largest faction within the party includes those who joined the AKP from the 
ranks of conventional centre-right parties – mainly the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the 
True Path Party. The other smaller three factions that occupy little space within the party 
involve Islamists from different sects who had joined the Welfare Party in the 1980s and 
1990s, and joined the AKP after a gradual liberalization of their views. These include Mr. 
Erdoğan’s close associates from the Istanbul municipality, some of whom were 
technocrats not affiliated with the NOM, and some former bureaucrats, such as former 
Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, who had previously served under centre-right 
governments.
65
 
The reformists realized that the West, especially the EU was a natural ally in decreasing 
the power of the military and in their quest for a system of democratic governance within 
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which Islamic social and political forces would be regarded as legitimate players. The 
stage was thus set for a new domestic and international adjustment of political aims and 
methods. 
 
 
III. CHAPTER THREE: THE AKP IN OFFICE 
III.1 The AKP published Program:
66
 
The program of the AKP as published on the AKP official website covers several 
objectives and policies of the party. One of the main principles of the AKP is the proverb, 
"Unless everyone is free, no one is free". The assurance of democratization by placing the 
individual at the center of all its policies, and providing and protecting fundamental 
human rights and freedoms are among the main tasks. The unity and the integrity of the 
Republic of Turkey, the secular, democratic, social state of law, and the processes of 
civilianization, democratization, freedom of belief and equality of opportunity are 
considered essential for the AKP. 
  The Party presents a political program that aims mainly to spread an 
understanding based on universal rights and freedoms to all areas, to eliminate the gap in 
the distribution of income, thus raise the welfare level of the people, involve citizens and 
non-governmental organizations in the public administration and create synergy within 
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society, and provide contemporary, rational, and realistic and easy to implement solutions 
in areas such as the economy, foreign policy, culture, arts, education, health, agriculture 
and animal husbandry. 
The party's programmatic emphasis is mainly in the following areas: fundamental 
rights and political principles, the economy, public administration, social policies and 
foreign policy. 
First: Fundamental Rights and Political Principles: 
This part addresses several topics including fundamental rights and freedoms, 
political principles, political structuring, law and justice, democratization and civil 
society and the East and the Southeast issue.  
Concerning fundamental rights and freedoms, the party believes that freedoms 
constitute the foundation of democracy, social peace and stability. Ataturk's principles 
and reforms are essential for raising the Turkish public above the level of contemporary 
civilization and the party sees this as an element of social peace.  
Second: The Economy 
The AKP defines the function of the state in economy as a regulator and 
controller and the formation of a more rational economic structure depends a lot on 
privatization. Concerning relations with the European Union, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and other international institutions it must be maintained along the lines 
of the requirements of Turkey's economy and national interests. The party is committed 
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to policies that control public finance (the budget, taxation, and public debts), 
privatization, production and investment, industrial property, foreign trade, financial 
services, tradesmen, artisans and small and medium scale enterprises, agriculture, animal 
husbandry and forestry, energy, mining, transportation and communication, tourism, and 
consumer protection. 
In general, the party aims at implementing a "Continuous and Sustainable 
Economic Growth Strategy" that contributes to the reduction of unemployment and 
poverty rates. 
Third: Public Administration 
The party defines the public administration as "the highest form of organization 
provided by the Constitution and the legislation, possessing the right and authority to use 
the government for the benefit of the society". The goal is to place the understanding of 
public administration in line with democratization, localization and civilianization. The 
party emphasizes on the concept of the "Constitutional State", where universal rights and 
freedoms of the citizens are maintained.  
“The State must withdraw from all service areas and remain exclusively in the 
areas of foreign security, justice, basic education, health and infrastructure services, 
which are its basic functions as an executing body, whereas its regulating and inspecting 
functions must continue.” 
In this area, the party's program puts policies and goals that cover the following 
issues: central government, local administration, public personnel management, security 
and combat against corruption. 
Fifth: Social Policies 
According to the AKP, the government shall implement social policies that assure 
the welfare of the citizens in addition to special programs that meet the needs of the poor, 
unemployed, ill and handicapped and children. This shall be implemented in cooperation 
with the local administration, NGOs and private sector. 
The party's program under this topic includes policies to improve education, 
culture and arts, public health, social security, labor, women, family and social services, 
youth and sports, urbanization and housing, environment, science and technology, written 
and visual media, and traffic. 
Sixth: Foreign Policy 
The party takes into consideration the history and geopolitical situation of Turkey 
when forming the country's foreign policy. The AKP shall follow several policies in this 
areas including: 
- Turkey shall take more initiative with regard to areas of crisis in neighboring regions 
and try to contribute more efficiently to the solution of these crises. Turkey shall make 
more efforts at providing security and stability in its near surroundings, shall increase its 
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attempts to keep good relations with its neighbors based on dialogue and regional 
cooperation. 
- Relations with European nations shall continue to be a priority in Turkey's foreign 
policy agenda. Turkey shall rapidly fulfill its promises in its relations with the European 
Union and the conditions, which the union demands of other candidate nations as well. 
- The cooperation with the United States of America which had been defense oriented 
shall be maintained and further it shall be extended to areas of the economy, investments, 
science and technology. 
- Friendly relations with the Russian Federation shall be maintained based on cooperation 
rather than competition in Central-Asia and the Caucuses. This also applies for the 
relation with china. 
- The bloodshed in the Middle East worries and concerns the Turkish public as it shares 
historical and cultural ties with this region. AKP believes that the only way to urgently 
stop the flow of blood and grievance, no matter to whom they belong is a lasting peace. 
Therefore, Turkey shall continue to support the efforts towards the achievement of the 
peace. 
- The Party pays a special attention to Turkey's relation with Islamic countries. Thus, it 
shall make efforts to increase bilateral cooperation with these nations on the one hand, 
while continuing attempts on the other for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
to have a more respectable place in the international arena and to have a dynamic 
structure able to take initiatives. 
The AKP’s  program is thus based mainly on adopting democratic values, rule of 
law, human rights and freedoms, pluralism, peace and conciliation to be applied on all the 
citizens regardless of the differences in sex, religion, language, culture and origin. The 
program puts the state in a position that regulates, controls, creates opportunities rather 
than imposing obstacles. 
It also seeks a form of economic development  based on reducing the costs 
brought on by globalization, watching public spending, supporting enterprises, installing 
an earning system based on production rather than collecting interests, reducing taxation 
rates while widening the tax base , insuring fair income distribution as well as 
contributing to the reduction of poverty and corruption.  
Importantly, the party does not put emphasis on ideology and refuses the 
separations that controlled the cold war era based on political ideologies. Rather, it sets a 
program aimed at satisfying the needs of the Turkish citizens in the first place and 
Turkish interests in the changing international environment. 
III.2 How does the AKP program differ from its predecessors? 
The following table compares the program of three political parties: AKP, SP, and RP 
Table 1. Comparative Evaluation of the Party Programs of the AKP, SP, and RP.
67
 
 AKP (2001) SP (2001) RP (1995) 
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Democracy -Strong emphasis on 
individual rights, 
minority rights, and civil 
society. 
-Explicit rejection of the 
misuse of religion for 
politics, and of the 
oppression of the 
different interpretations 
and practices of religion. 
-Conspicuous absence or 
shortage of references to 
religious rights or to the 
question of secularism. 
-Lip service to 
democratization and 
individual rights and 
almost no 
mentioning of civil 
society. 
-Emphasis on the 
question of 
secularism, what it 
is and what it is not. 
-Reference to 
individual rights and 
freedoms, with 
strong emphasis on 
religious freedoms. 
-No reference to 
individual or 
human rights. 
-Major emphasis on 
social rights and 
freedom to practice 
religion. 
 
Economic 
role of the 
state 
-State’s role in the 
economy defined as 
regulator and 
Supervisor. 
-Emphasis on (fast and 
transparent) privatization 
and structural reforms 
-Emphasis on 
welfare state. 
-Need for a shift 
from rent seeking 
economy to “just” 
economy. 
-Establishment of a 
-Extremely 
significant. 
-Strong 
redistributive role 
for the state. 
- An active role for 
the state in 
-A diminished role for the 
state in agriculture 
“guidance and 
guarantee fund” for 
agricultural sector. 
subsidizing 
industrial 
development. 
-Privatization de- 
emphasized 
Nationalism -Weak nationalistic 
flavor. 
-Almost every policy and 
reform is justified by 
reference to international 
treaties, especially the 
Copenhagen Criteria, and 
Globalization. 
-Emphasis on Turkey’s 
need to keep pace with 
regional and global trends 
-Moderate 
nationalistic flavor. 
-National interest 
frequently used as 
justification of 
policy positions. 
- Lip service to 
international 
obligations. 
- Embrace of 
integration with the 
EU. 
-Very strong 
nationalistic 
flavor. 
-Conceives Turkey 
as the leader of the 
Muslim world 
Religion and 
moral values 
-Defines itself as 
conservative democratic 
and emphasizes 
values, traditions, and 
social norms as crucial in 
the good working of the 
-Moral-ethical 
values and 
spiritualism offered 
as the ultimate 
solution to most 
problems (e.g. 
-Very strong. 
-Outlines specific 
recommendations 
with special 
reference to Islamic 
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system. 
-No special reference to 
religious values 
poverty). 
-Advocates 
mandatory religion 
and ethics classes in 
schools. 
-Critical of 
materialism. 
values and 
practices. 
- A major 
distinguishing 
characteristic of the 
party program. 
The table above gives a brief summary of the published program of the AKP, SP 
and RP. Concerning the promotion of democracy, the AKP de- emphasized the issue of 
religion with more emphasis on civil liberties and human rights. Also it stressed the 
importance of enhancing the role of civil society, raising its capacities, taking its opinion 
into consideration, giving it the opportunity to reach the level of contemporary 
democratic countries. 
In comparison, the SP though putting less emphasis on the issue of 
democratization, human rights and civil liberties than the AKP but it gave greater 
consideration to these issues than the banned WP which promoted religious freedoms at 
the first level with no clear reference to the human rights and liberties in general.  
The matter of secularism is also a point of difference between the three parties, as 
the AKP preferred to skip the issue of questioning secularism but rather indicated the 
importance of separating religion from politics in addition to praising the role of Ataturk's 
reforms and principles in coping with the contemporary civilization. However, both the 
SP and RP raised the question of secularism as a major matter in their programs. The 
AKP program assures the party's commitment to the values and constitution of the 
Turkish Republic. In contrast, to the prevailing Islamic political identity based on the 
western opposition, a very skilful new discourse regarding the adoption of western values 
as an ally against the restrictions of the Kemalist state was adopted by the AKP. 
In addition, the economic role of the state is a matter of great difference among 
the three parties. The AKP has a unique view towards this issue as it considers the state's 
role as a controller and supervisor with a big emphasis on privatization which differs 
significantly from the role drawn by the WP which gives the state a much more 
interfering role in the economy. However, the welfare state is a common goal emphasized 
by both the SP and AKP. In addition, the anti – globalization discourse adopted earlier by 
the AKP predecessors was abandoned as the economic crisis of 2001 made the 
commitment to the IMF program and the attraction of foreign investments an anchor for 
overcoming the Turkish financial crisis and integrating Turkey into the global economy. 
In other words, the difference between the WP and AKP lies in the different 
conception the both have for the state and the economy as the WP, considered 
traditionalist tend more “to be state- oriented and to favor dirigisme” while the AKP 
,considered reformers tend more “to seek support in society and to favor a (liberal) 
market economy.” 68 
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In short, the AKP's program approve of neo- liberal order in which there is a clear 
withdrawal of the state from the economy in order to achieve a productive and free 
market economy as a prerequisite for a democratic regime.
69
  
The issue of nationalism and membership of EU went through several stages 
starting from the WP that was promoting Turkish leadership to the Muslim world and the 
importance of building strong relations with the Muslim countries rather than the 
Christian ones (the West) including the EU which was described by them as a  “Christian 
Club.” 
The SP adopted a more moderate nationalistic language, embraced the integration 
with the EU, and showed more commitment to international obligations. On the other 
hand, the AKP differs greatly from both parties as it emphasizes the importance of 
relations with the Middle East and neighboring countries as well as the European, 
western, and Asian ones. In addition, the role of Turkey in keeping the peace regionally 
and globally is deeply emphasized. The AKP bases its reforms and policies on 
international treaties mainly the Copenhagen Criteria, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Charter and Helsinki Final Act. 
One can notice several points while reading the three programs represented 
mainly in the lack of a clear cut difference in the programs of both the RP and SP 
although the latter tries to use a more modern discourse and vocabulary especially 
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Alternatives 2.1 (2003): 108. http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/caha.pdf 
regarding EU membership, but it can in one way or another be considered an extension of 
the values of the WP and the earlier NVM. The AKP's discourse , language, self-
definition  and policies on the other hand show a deep shift from the earlier ideology as it 
adopts a more democratic and liberal discourse with more emphasis on general morals 
and values as a main guide for all religions and secular ones as well. 
It is worth mentioning that women’s rights and more generally, gender issues 
were embedded in the program of the SP and AKP but with no clear or detailed 
indications regarding  this important question, which is now of the main topics in the 
contemporary democratic countries. However, the WP raised the issue of Muslim 
women’s right to wear a headscarf in governmental facilities as an important one. For the 
AKP, the party's view of the headscarf issue was best indicated through Erdogan 
speeches on TV programs in which he explained that they would not take on sensitive 
topics like the headscarf problem and the prohibition of female students to attend 
universities with headscarves. Although during the election campaign, he admitted that 
this was a serious problem, he has time and again emphasized that this should not be a 
matter for his own party alone. In other words, all of the political parties had a share of 
responsibility for finding solution for the problem.
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The following table compares the terminologies used by the AKP and SP in their 
published programs: 
Table 2. Comparative Frequency of Key Terms in the Party Programs of the AKP and 
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SP
71
 
 
As the individual is the constructivist’s unit of analysis, it is worth having a look 
at some main differences among the key leaders of the WP and AKP namely, Erbakan 
and Erdogan, stressing the role of the different attitudes and beliefs of both characters in 
the change occurred in the mentality, practice and discourse of both political parties as 
well as stressing the role of the lessons learnt by the AKP leader from Erbakan’s 
mistakes. 
                                                          
71
 - Murat Somer, Muslim Democrats, 14 
Word  
AKP-Program (per 10 pages) SP-Program (per 10 pages) 
Welfare( Refah) 2.0 6.4 
Religion  1.6 3.8 
Muslim 0.0 0.5 
Human rights  2.0 1.3 
Justice (Adalet) 2.9 9.7 
Civil Society  4.7 2.0 
Minority 0.6 0 
Morality (Ahlak)  0.8 3.3 
Spirituality (Maneviyat)  0.0 3.1 
Nation (millet)  1.6 9.2 
Erbakan and Erdogan are the most significant figures that have been influential in 
the modern Turkish Islamist political parties as the change in their concepts and ideas 
contributed to the change that Turkey is witnessing today. For Erbakan, though he 
continuously insisted on using freedom of thought and freedom of conscience in his 
speeches, what he had in mind was markedly different and entailed an inflexible party 
structure in which the party supplies an identity to the members: he thus managed to 
create a party with a closed ideology. This matter was modified by Erdogan, who 
believed in pluralism as the way to reach all social sectors (rightist, nationalist, leftist and 
Islamist) and managed thus to obtain their support as a result as well as modifying the 
AKP’s identity, steering it away from what might be termed “pure Islamism.” This 
repositioning affected the party’s popularity positively.72 
The gender issue, and in particular, identifying the political role of women, 
especially in the decision making process, was a matter at first neglected by Erbakan who 
once defended the concept of keeping women out of the decision making process. On the 
other hand, it was Erdogan who set up the first women’s commission within the WP in 
the late 1980s and worked to modify the party’s view concerning the inclusion of women 
in the decision making process later on.
73
 
In foreign policy approaches, the two leaders visited and opened relations with 
different countries, revealing differences in priorities and even in goals. While Erbakan 
focused on countries like Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Libya and Egypt aiming to work on 
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an anti- western coalition. In contrast Erdogan, who aimed to have open relations with all 
international actors, visited almost all EU capitals in order to reveal his party’s pro – EU 
policy.
74
 
Erdogan continuously kept in mind the political end faced by his mentor, and so 
he traced a more moderate line for himself. Early on, Erdogan had insisted on the fact 
that “my reference is Islam”   and on the fact that “you cannot be secular and Muslim at 
the same time…” With the passage of time he shifted to a more conciliatory discourse, 
admitting that change is everywhere and cannot be avoided.
75
 In addition, Erdogan who 
was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 get his prominence on the domestic level as a 
result of his pragmatic performance during his position as a mayor of Istanbul. This is 
stated explicitly on the official AKP website, which stressed the key role played by his 
role in good governance in Istanbul and an excellent performance as mayor in his rise to 
power, thanks to widespread popular support. The structural interaction of people, 
conditions, policies, and socio-economic factors are seen in the present case study to have 
heavily determined domestic, regional and world politics. 
 Some point to the fact that it could actually have been even better, since 
Erdoğan's personality has had a partly negative impact on Turkish politics. "Mr. Erdogan 
is said to speak no foreign languages and to know little about the outside world. Many 
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feared ahead of the election that he might change his views again if his party came to 
power."
76
  
The sometimes emotional performance of the prime minister is also seen in the 
incident of Erdogan storming off the stage after an emotional debate with Shimon Peres, 
Israel’s president, in a session about Israel’s treatment of Gaza, during The World 
Economic Forum held in Davos on 29 December 2009. 
 
III.3 the successive electoral victories: 
The following section will provide an analysis of the electoral results of three 
successive elections in which the AKP made its breakthrough and improved its score, 
reaching power and maintaining it for more than a decade.  
III.3.1 the 2002 elections: 
After nearly one year of its establishment, the AKP entered the general elections 
with its published program that succeeded in achieving a notable victory. It gained 34% 
of the votes while the Republican People’s Party - CHP was able to gain 19% of the 
votes, both were thus able to cross the 10% threshold needed for the parliamentary 
representation. The AKP gained almost two- thirds of the seats in the National Assembly 
which enabled it to form a government on its own.
77
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Several factors led to this indisputable victory including: the adoption of a more 
moderate and pragmatic political message, the disastrous performance of the Turkish 
economy (the Turkish currency was devalued several times, the banking sector was 
devastated, and the economy shrank by a historic 9.5% in 2001), the spread of corruption 
among the mainstream secular parties, and the demise of the left in the early 1990s which 
led to targeting the working class neighborhoods.  “The AKP made its biggest gains 
among the recent immigrants in the varoş, a group which today forms a plurality in 
Turkish urban areas. These people are pious and socially conservative and are not 
attracted to secular parties on either the left or the right. The varoş is one of the most 
important sources of AKP power. The AKP has skillfully drawn on its well-developed 
local infrastructure and social networks, much of which were established by the Welfare 
Party, to expand its political support among the working-class poor in Turkey’s large 
urban areas. These factors, rather than an appeal to Islam, explain the AKP’s success.”78   
The theoretical model we propose explains how the retreat from “Islamic” statism and the 
adoption of fundamentally liberal economic policies, first domestically, then 
internationally, could have been possible and as momentum was built, became likely, 
under the AKP. Constructivism takes, as it were, an anthropological approach to the 
social and political world (both domestic and international), positing a strong interaction 
between political elites and material conditions, rather than an inflexible and 
ideologically driven process, in which documents and abstract beliefs, rather than 
evolving human realities, drive change.  
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 According to Meltem Muftuler-Bac’s The New Face of Turkey: the Domestic and 
Foreign Policy Implications of November 2002 Elections, paradoxically, the November 
2002 elections in Turkey have highlighted the religious and cultural differences between 
Turkey and the European Union, meanwhile strengthening democratic institutions in 
Turkey.  Moreover, the victory of 2002 was due to many reasons but one of the most 
important is that the Turkish public looked for a new leader to solve the economic, social 
and political problems that previous parties in power had been unable to handle. The 
author finds that the economic crisis and the resulting social outburst have been to the 
AKP's advantage as they were able to present an alternative to the existing administration 
of the country. In other words, hungry and unemployed masses voted for AKP which 
focused on socio-economic issues.
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The AKP’s moderate, non-confrontational rhetoric has made it attractive to a 
diverse array of voters ranging from Islamists to rural nationalists and moderate urban 
voters. The AKP responded to middle and working class voters, who were displeased 
with the economic plans of the outgoing government. As a result, it was able to attract 
many moderate urban voters, who were angry at the inefficient and corruption-ridden 
governments of the 1990s in addition to the political instability and economic downturns 
that characterized this decade. Many voters turned to the AKP, which labeled itself as 
new and not affected by the legacy of the 1990s. On the other hand, the November 
elections clarified the efficiency and importance of the personality of the AKP leader 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A lot of people voted for him, regardless of his controversial 
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pedigree or the legal obstacles he faced. Thus, the interaction of individuals and societies, 
(the pillar of the constructivist theory) is seen to have played a key role in the 2002 
victory and in the move towards collective change, based on the transformation of the 
ideas of individuals.
80
 
“However, having been in power during the deep economic crisis of 2001, the 
DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition which, in the aftermath of 1999 elections, had an electoral 
support of about 54% obtained only about 15% of the votes in November 2002. This is 
the largest drop in Turkish electoral history for an incumbent or coalition in two 
consecutive elections.”81 
According to Tahran Erdem, a public opinion analyst, the AKP had received votes 
in the 2002 elections from electorates that voted earlier for other parties. In comparison 
with the 1999 general elections, 69% of the Virtue Party, 38% of the National Action 
Party, 28% of the Motherland Party, 21% of the True Path Party, and 14% of the 
Democratic Left Party voters voted for the AKP in November 2002.This indicates that 
the AKP attracted almost all sectors of society and even won the support of the 
conservative right. The AKP voters vary from the poor of the urban periphery to 
conservative peasants in the depth of Anatolia and to the demanding provincial 
entrepreneurs. In other words, the AKP enjoyed the trust of different people from various 
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ideological, social and geographical backgrounds.
82
 This is clearly indicative of a 
landmark shift in collective identity. 
The following table indicates the results of November 2002 elections in 
comparison to those of 1999:  
Table 3. Election results and aggregate party system characteristics 1999-2002
83
 
 Seats in the 
Parliament 
 Vote Share (%) % wins 
and losses 
 1999 2002 1999 2002 
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) 22.19 1.22 -20.97 136 0 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) 17.98 8.34 -9.64 129 0 
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP)* 15.41 2.48 -12.93 111 0 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) 13.22 5.13 -8.09 86 0 
True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP) 12.01 9.55 -2.46 85 0 
Republican People's Party (Cuhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) 8.71 19.40 10.69 0 178 
People's Democarcy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-
HADEP)** 
4.75 6.23 1.48 0 0 
Grand Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP) 1.46 1.02 -0.44 0 0 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi-AKP) 
0.00 34.28 34.28 0 363 
Young Party (Genç Parti-GP) 0.00 7.25 7.25 0 0 
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Independents*** 0.87 0.99 0.12 3 9 
Total 96.60 95.89  550 550 
Other Parties 3.40 4.11 0.71   
Volatility 20.15 50.91 ****   
Fractionalisation 85.15 81.44 *****   
**** Highest (ideological) volatility ever in the Turkish party system. 
*****Lowest fractionalisation since 1991 elections. 
The graph above shows among other things that in 2002, ideological volatility 
(voter shifts in party allegiances) was the highest in history, underscoring the depth and 
breadth of shifts in Turkish collective identity. At the same time, it shows that the level of 
fractionalization was minimal, permitting a comprehensive takeover of governmental 
initiatives.  
III.3.2 the 2007 elections: 
On 27 April 2007, the army General staff posted a memorandum on its website 
accusing the government of having a secret Islamic agenda. This was after the 
government nominated Abdullah Gul for the post of president, a man controversial due 
his Islamic roots and his headscarfed wife. 
  Following the memorandum hundreds of thousands gathered in Turkey’s major 
cities protesting against the government. The memorandum implicitly indicated that the 
army would intervene directly to protect secularism. On the other hand, the government 
issued a counter – statement in which it reminded the soldiers that they were government 
employees, and that it was not acceptable in a democracy that the military intervene in 
politics. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court upheld a case brought by the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition group, arguing that the first round of 
parliamentary voting to elect the president was invalid due to the lack of a 2/3 quorum, a 
claim that was accepted by the Court which decided that 367 deputies were needed for a 
quorum and the first ballot was invalid.
84
 
As a result, Gul was obliged to withdraw his nomination and Erdogan called for 
early elections for 22 July rather than the 4th of November. Fourteen political parties 
participated in the elections of 2007. The party’s campaigns were dominated by several 
issues: the elections of the next president, a possible military incursion into Northern Iraq 
(the Kurdish issue), and economic issues.
85
 The AKP took advantage of what happened 
and depicted itself as the defender of democracy and the victim of military intervention as 
well as promising to seek constitutional changes that would allow people to elect their 
president directly. However, the CHP campaign was based on blaming the AKP for the 
crisis, with less emphasis on democracy, in addition to forming a block with the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) to increase its share in the vote. It did not, however, 
propose any distinctive socio – economic programs. As for the other opposition parties, 
they failed to convince the voters that social cohesion and economic prosperity was on 
the way.
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 The opposition thus failed to convince voters, on the contrary. Note the reality-
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rather than ideologically based approach to politics on the part of the AKP in this (and 
other) critical instance: this is clearly an example of a one step back, two step forwards 
approach it adopted, in line, incidentally, with constructivism’s view of social and 
political adaptation, domestically and then internationally. 
In July 2007, the ruling AKP achieved a landslide victory with 47% of the vote, 
the largest share for a single party since 1957. The results were surprising for all those 
who predicted the contrary, due to the division within Turkish society and the continuity 
of the polarity between secularism and anti – secularism, which showed it to be less than 
expected. In addition, the results indicated the dissatisfaction of the Turkish public with 
military intervention in political life. The electorate chose the party that focused more on 
the issues that had a direct impact on their own lives. Turkey’s political transformation 
was thus showed to be based on a solid popular base. 
The AKP also managed to convince the Kurds to vote for it by promising to solve 
their problem and giving them more rights and freedoms. Moreover, the representation of 
women and independents rose as the number of women in parliament increased from 24 
to 50 (30 of them AKP members). The 2007 elections were the first in 16 years where 
Kurdish nationalists had the opportunity to be represented in the parliament. They later 
helped the AKP to achieve a 2/3 quorum leading to the successful elections of Gul as a 
president on 29 August. 
Prime Minister Erdogan described the election result as, ‘the reflex of the national 
will in response to what was done to Abdullah’. The Speaker of Parliament and one of 
the founders of the AKP, Bulent Arinc, characterized the outcome as a ‘civilian 
memorandum’. Both remarks followed up on the AKP’s electoral strategy of presenting 
the party as a victim. After the elections, the AKP decided to retain Gul as its presidential 
candidate, claiming that 47% of the vote was proof of popular support for his 
nomination.”87 
The following table shows the results of 2007 general elections:
88
  
Table 4. July 22, 2007 General Election Results  
 
 Registered Electors    42,799,303      
 Voters    36,056,293  84.2%    
 Valid Votes    35,049,691      
Party Votes  % Seats 
 
 Justice and Development Party (AKP)    16,327,291  46.6  341  
 Republican People's Party (CHP)    7,317,808  20.9  112  
 Nationalist Action Party (MHP)    5,001,869  14.3  70  
 Independents    1,835,486  5.2  26  
 Democrat Party (DP)    1,898,873  5.4  0  
 Young Party (GP)    1,064,871  3.0  0  
 Felicity Party (SP)    820,289  2.3  0  
 Others    783,204  2.2  0  
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III.3.3 the 2011 elections: 
On June 12 2011, the Turkish voters went to the polls yet another time to elect the 
country's 550-seat Grand National Assembly. The Turkish election went as everyone 
expected it would, a landslide victory for the AK Party, chosen to lead Turkey for a third 
term. The AKP won 49.8 % of the votes, giving them 326 seats in a 550 seat parliament 
though Erdogan was looking forward to 330 seats that would have given him a super-
majority in parliament and would have allowed him to make changes to the constitution 
without seeking the support of other parties. 
Higher than during the previous election, 78 of the 550 newly elected MPs were 
women, thus making up 14.2% of the total number of representatives (2007:9.2%). 45 of 
those female MPs belong to the AKP, 19 are members of the CHP, 11 are members of the 
BDP, and three are members of the MHP.
89
 
 
This victory can be attributed to Turkey's good economic performance: about 
60% of AKP voters stated that the economic situation was the main reason for their 
choice. Poor immigrants in cities, the rural population, but also the emerging bourgeoisie 
chose economic and political stability characteristic of the AKP era. The AKP 
government’s professional performance as well as the Prime Minister's populist skills 
played a major role in the success. Erdogan continuously came up with new major 
projects for all the different cities and regions, among those plans, which endeared 
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Erdogan to many voters, were projects to create new commuter towns for Istanbul, 
construct new airports, develop Turkey's own defense industry, and even construct a 
second Bosphorus. The AKP also managed to win more conservative voters; almost all of 
the nationalist parties’ strongholds were won by the AKP.90 These results came in light of 
major changes in the region especially in the Arab World and mainly the situation of 
Syria that terrifies the Turks regarding the prospect of another Iraq on their southern 
border as well as the tension with Israel after the incident of the Marmara flotilla. 
Speaking at a victory rally in the capital, Ankara, Erdogan adopted a conciliatory 
tone: "Today workers, pensioners, farmers have won. People in the villages have won. 
Today 74 million people have won. Today the western world, Tripoli, Gaza have won. 
The Middle East, the Balkans, Europe have won. Peace, justice and stability have won." 
Of the planned new constitution, he said: "We will go to the opposition. We will consult 
with the media and academics to find a consensus. We will not close our doors regarding 
the constitution, only because we haven't reached 330 seats."
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The following table shows the results of 2011 general elections:
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Table 5.  June 12, 2011 General Election Results 
 
 Registered Electors    52,806,322      
 Voters    43,914,948  83.2%    
 Valid Votes    42,941,763      
Party Votes  % Seats 
 
 Justice and Development Party (AKP)    21,399,082  49.8  326  
 Republican People's Party (CHP)    11,155,972  26.0  135  
 Nationalist Action Party (MHP)    5,585,513  13.0  53  
 Independents    2,819,917  6.6  35  
 Felicity Party (SP)    543,454  1.3  0  
 Others    1,437,825  3.3  0  
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IV.CHAPTER FOUR:  THE RULE OF THE AKP 
IV.1 the Turkish Economy under the AKP: 
In spite of the global economic crisis over the last few years, the Turkish 
economy was able to achieve steady growth due to a combination of a macroeconomic 
strategy, cautious financial policies and structural reforms. The structural reforms which 
were widely hastened by the Turkey's EU accession bid opened the space for various 
changes in a number of areas that include increasing the role played by the private sector 
in the Turkish economy, enhancing the efficiency and resiliency of the financial sector, 
and placing the social security system on a more solid foundation.
93
 
These reforms have empowered Turkey's macroeconomic basics and decreased 
inflation to 6.4 % by the end of 2010 in comparison to 30% in 2002. In addition, the GDP 
levels more than tripled to USD 736 billion in 2010, up from USD 231 billion in 2002, 
GDP per capita soared to USD 10,079, up from USD 3,500 in the given period. As for 
foreign trade, exports reached USD 114 billion by the end of 2010, up from USD 36 
billion in 2002. Similarly, tourism revenues, which were around USD 8.5 billion in 2002, 
exceeded USD 20 billion in 2010. In 2011 , GDP level was  USD 772 billion and GDP 
growth was 8.5%.Whereas total exports reached USD 135 billion and total FDI inflow 
was USD 15.9 billion .In addition, the  number of foreign  companies as of the end of 
2011 was 29,283.
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Average Annual Real GDP Growth (%) 2002-2011 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2012, Turkish Statistical Institute (Turk 
Stat) 
Annual Average Real GDP Growth (%) Forecast in OECD Countries 2011-2017 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No: 86 
The following sections will highlight the main economic developments that 
Turkey witnessed since 2002: 
IV.1.1 Unemployment 
Unemployment is an issue that concerns both developed and developing countries 
as it are not only an economic problem but also a social one that may affect the stability 
of any society. Many reasons play a role in increasing unemployment such as inflation, 
demographic changes, economic crises, macroeconomic factors…etc.95 
 In economic theory, a linear positive relationship between economic growth and 
employment had long been supposed. However, Turkish economic growth since 2002 , 
taking into consideration the global economic crisis in 2008,  wasn't able to achieve 
sufficient job creation which is called a “jobless growth” as it does not generate sufficient 
employment to reduce the unemployment rate.
96
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Unemployment Rate in Turkey (%)
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Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury  
From 2002 to 2009, the employment rate in the agricultural sector declined from 
34.9 % (7.46million) to 24.7 % (5.28 million), in the services sector it increased from 
42.1 % to 50 %, in the industrial sector it increased from 18.5 % to 19.4 % and in the 
construction sector it increased from 4.5 % to 5.9 %. These indicators show that it's clear 
that there is an employment transition from agriculture to industry and especially to 
services. Between 2002 and 2008, while 3 million new jobs were created in urban areas, 
3.3 million jobs disappeared in rural areas and in this specific period, several types of 
jobs mainly in the services sector, emerged as new areas of employment. These are retail 
industry (from 18 % to 22 %), financial services sector (from 3 % to 6 %) and social and 
personal services (from 14 % to 17 %).
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IV.1.2 Inflation: 
For more than two decades, high inflation was a major problem facing the Turkish 
economy. However, a drop in inflation rates occurred after 2002 as it declined more than 
60% as a result of tight monetary and fiscal policies under the anti-inflationary 
program.
99
  
Graph CPI (Consumer price index) Turkey long-term100 
 
IV.1.3 Housing: 
The Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) has constructed 
more than 500,000 buildings across Turkey since 2002 as Turkey is currently undergoing 
a renewal process in which TOKI would like to contribute to the modern urbanization of 
Turkey.
101
 These projects include the urban renewal areas: Zağnos and Tabakhane Urban 
Renewal Projects, Çömlekçi Urban Renewal Project Ayasofya Urban Renewal Project, 
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Pelitli Urban Renewal Project, Çağlayan Urban Renewal Project, Ortahisar Urban 
Renewal Project, Yomra Urban Renewal Project. 
The housing projects enabled more than 1 million people to buy more modern and 
resilient houses from these projects, undertaken by TOKİ in cooperation with private 
construction companies which gave a boost to Turkish construction companies and also 
curtailed the rise of slums at least to some extent around the country.
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IV.1.4 Tax reforms: 
A medium-term tax reform strategy was implemented according to a review 
carried out jointly with the World Bank in 2002.  The main purpose of the strategy was to 
develop the stability, transparency and equity of the tax system through measures and 
procedures that minimize tax distortions, broaden the tax base and improve the efficiency 
of the tax administration.
103
 
A legislative package of tax reforms was implemented which included direct 
measures related to the personal and the corporate income tax (investment tax allowance, 
free trade zones and regional tax incentives). In addition there were the indirect tax 
reforms, simplifying the system so as to align them with EU rules where a unified Special 
Consumption Tax (SCT) was introduced in August 2002. This tax replaced a range of 
selective taxes on oil products, vehicles, alcohol and tobacco products and a range of 
luxury consumer goods into a one single tax. Moreover, the tax strategy included reforms 
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of tax administration that include institutional improvements, automation, transparency, 
compliance, taxpayer services and tax audit.
104
 
In conclusion, the Turkish economy witnessed significant prosperity and 
refreshment under AKP but there are several aspects that still need to be tackled such as 
the improvement of livestock production in which Turkey needs to introduce measures 
concerning dairy and meat products. This is an area largely neglected by Turkey in 
comparison with EU countries, and as a result of this, the sector is under risk of total 
collapse.
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The AKP in general has put effort into improving the economic situation aiming 
to raise the standard of living for the Turkish citizens and their trust in the AKP’s 
credibility as a result, a matter that was successfully reflected in the ballot boxes. And 
most importantly, in line with the predictions of constructivism in the area of political 
economy, the reforms instituted are all of a powerfully liberal (or “neo – liberal”) nature, 
contrasting with the traditional centralism and protectionism of Islamist parties. 
IV.2 Turkish foreign policy under AKP: 
After the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy entered a new phase of adaptation to the global 
changes as well as domestic ones after the rise of the unipolar global system and the 
disappearance of the Cold War international paradigm. In effect, Turkey was obliged to 
find alternatives for its foreign and security interests and priorities with more emphasis 
on cultural, historical and geographical dimensions in the region through a more 
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integrative approach. 
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The AKP and before it the WP, argued powerfully in favor of an opening to all of 
Turkey’s neighbors. Domestic factors played a central role in the change witnessed in the 
Turkish regional foreign policy. The argument here is that such a change is a part of a 
fundamental domestic one that could be seen as a reorientation or rearrangement of the 
overall domestic and social context in Turkey that  led to the emergence of a 
transformation in the Turkish priorities as well as changes in the country's institutional 
power relations.
107
 
After the undermining of the political order dominated by Kemalism from 1923, 
Turkey faced the rise of new power centers especially the new circles that rose to power 
in the form of the Islamic-conservative elite that has held power since 2002 and 
powerfully influenced foreign policy. 
As discussed above, some of the most important domestic reasons for the shift were 
population growth, urbanization, economic change, and political reforms connected with 
the convergence with the EU. The underdeveloped regions in Anatolia were facing a 
severe development disparity between industrialized and rural regions leading to 
migration and population growth in urban regions in which the labor market was not able 
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to handle the flow of migrants, to high levels of hidden unemployment in light of the 
incapacity of the authorities to provide basic public services. These social and economic 
factors were essential in the loss of confidence by citizens in the state and its institutions. 
On the other hand, domestic changes led to greater influence by Turkish civil society, one 
of the actors that have been rising since the end of the 1990s along with the loosening of 
domestic and international restraints.
108
 
In 1999 and 2001, Turkey faced a grave economic crisis. Corruption and lack of 
political leadership in policy-making were the main factors which led the International 
Monetary Fund to press for reforms that provide more transparency in addition to those 
imposed by the EU in the field of democracy and human rights. The AKP thus declared 
that its aim was “to reform the elitist and strict secularism in place in Turkey.”109 This 
aim, however, was to be achieved by building a new liberal pluralism and maintaining 
secularism. The AKP’s stated goal was to achieve economic modernization by actually 
abandoning ideology, not imposing a new one. This was in line with global ideological 
trends marked by convergence in politics and economics, across religious and ideological 
divides. 
This view has its impact on AKP foreign policy priorities as seen in a variety of 
significant choices. First, accession to the EU continued to be a primary goal, a strategy 
that is important for winning elections and for decreasing the role of military through 
reforms. Second, the AKP sought to achieve of a “strategic depth” aiming to position 
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Turkey as a regional force for peace and stability. Third, the objective became a “zero-
problem” policy or a “good –neighbor” policy. 
Hamlet Davutoglu is considered the godfather of the Turkish foreign policy 
pursued since 2002. His doctrine as presented in his “Strategic Dept: Turkish 
International Position” shaped the path of the Turkish foreign policy with its particular 
attention to Turkey’s potential as a major factor in the region. One cannot analyze 
Turkey’s foreign policy without taking into consideration Davutoglu’s ideas. 
Davutoglu's “Strategic Dept: Turkish International Position” published in 
2001(one year before the AKP came to rule) focuses on the nation's value in world 
politics, based on its geo –strategic position and historical depth. According to 
Davutoglu, Turkey possesses both the geo strategic position based in its control over the 
Bosporus and its connections with the Balkans, the Middle East, and even Central Asia as 
well as the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire that once had unified the Muslim 
world and had been a superpower. In addition to Turkey’s regional position m Davutoglu 
stressed its global strategic role.
110
 
He rejects the notion of Turkey as a simple bridge between the West and Islam. 
Rather, in his view, Turkey should take advantage of its soft power potential in order to 
develop a policy that copes with its geographic and historical depth. Therefore, it should 
change the militaristic image showed during the past era and instead focus on promoting 
conflict resolution and regional economic cooperation. In other words, Turkey has two 
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fronts to focus on in order to achieve its global strategic ambitions. The first is domestic 
politics in which Turkey needs to resolve its own Kurdish question, as well as bridge the 
growing rift between the Islamist and secularist elements of Turkish society. The second 
is the relations with neighbors. Turkey, he argues, needs to resolve all bilateral disputes 
which have worsened its relations with its neighbors in the quest for a “zero problem 
policy.”  
Taking socio-economic developments, the transformation of the ruling elite, and 
the strategic thinking of Davutoglu together, along with electoral outcomes, the following 
generalizations may be made regarding the new foreign policy: 
IV.2.1 Multi- level identity rather than pure westernization: 
During the cold war, Turkey’s identity was defined according to the international 
context at that particular time, mainly according to the ideological stance of countries. 
Therefore, Turkey joined NATO and identified with the western bloc with pro-western 
and pro-American interests.
111
 
When the Cold War came to an end, Turkey’s fixed identity faced a problem in 
light of the increasing importance of other, long suppressed identities in Turkish society 
and there was no room for the isolation and stagnancy in the foreign relations that Turkey 
witnessed during the Cold War. 
Under the AKP Turkey defined itself as “central country” with multiple regional 
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identities which force it to have a more active role in the region especially with the 
countries with which it shares borders as well as constituting a de facto bridge between 
the West and Muslim World. Erdoğan claims that “our responsibilities are not just 
internal anymore but in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus [...]”.112 
This shift in identity led the AKP to follow a more multi - dimensional foreign 
policy having in mind Turkey’s geo – strategic position in line with the political, 
economic and social structure, power and potentials of Turkey.  Thus, Turkey plays a role 
in regional and world politics, taking an original position regarding the occupation of Iraq 
and the Kurdish dilemma, the Iranian role in the Middle East, the Israeli – Palestinian 
conflict, political economy and the clash of civilizations.
113
  
For many years the military was the guard of Turkish identity in terms of its 
secularity and westernization which entails a strategy of de-orientalization at home and 
moving away from the Middle East in foreign policy. However, this identity was not 
negotiated with the society’s minorities that have their own identities which were 
considered threats to the security of the state’s identity.114 
After the rise of political Islam in Turkish public life during the late 1990s, the 
debate between the Islamic and secular identity of the Turkish state was intensified and 
reflected in foreign policy choices.  
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For decades Turkey has followed a unidimensional security - oriented foreign 
policy perceived under tough threat perceptions. In this context, Turkey could not put 
forward its own strategic thought as a result of its fixed defensive position, and just tried 
to eliminate the threats in perception with reactive short term counter tactics. Passive 
reactions with strategic deflections were determined in international politics, instead of a 
self-initiated active policy formulation with a strategic persistence.
115
  
On the other hand, the Kurdish crisis is another matter of identity conflict in 
Turkey. The Kurdish issue has been festering for a long time, and has achieved crisis 
proportions over the past several decades, characterized by clashes with the PKK, in fact, 
as it has been a problem since the foundation of the republic and is a real challenge facing 
the AKP. The AKP is aware that getting the support of the Kurdish population through 
solving the Kurdish problem is a must. The AKP can separate the Kurds from the PKK 
naturally by meeting the needs of identity of the Kurds rather than a policy seeking to 
separate the Kurds from the PKK with no vision of a future reconciliation. Rebuilding the 
confidence of the Kurdish people is a prerequisite for social peace. The PKK is likely to 
resist such efforts, and bring to bear the incompatibility of the Turkish state and Kurdish 
aspirations.
116
 After having first thought the Kurds would fit into the plan for zero 
problems, the AKP has had to recognize that the issue is much more complicated, and it 
would appear that the revolution neighboring Syria makes matters even more difficult to 
resolve, since the Assad regime will try its best to exacerbate social problems in Turkey.  
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Identity and Turkish – EU relations: 
When the AKP came to power it realized that Europeanization required more 
open, democratic, plural and civil society on the basis of EU norms which would help 
them to emancipate their identity from the Kemalist limits.
117
   
When analyzing EU – Turkish relations during the rule of AKP one can divide it 
into two major phases, where the first one from 2002 till 2005 and the second from 2005 
to the present. The year 2005 can be considered a distinctive one in terms of Turkish 
enthusiasm towards EU membership as it was then that EU accession negotiations began.   
The first phase can be titled the “golden age of Europeanization in Turkey” where 
the reforms at several levels in Turkish life took place. Economically, the IMF and EU 
motivated regulatory reforms that helped the achievement of economic growth in Turkey 
as explained earlier in this thesis. Moreover, the civil reforms reflected in more 
democratization and a more active role for civil society was also achieved during this 
golden era. However, the main area affected by the Europeanization process was foreign 
policy. 
118
 
Just after the announcement of the electoral results of November 2002, the leader 
of the AKP Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a series of visits to EU leaders. These aimed at 
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explaining the AKP’s point of view and Turkey’s willingness to achieve the needed 
reforms according to the criteria of the Copenhagen (1993) and Helsinki (1999) summits 
including the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, minority rights and 
a functioning market economy that matches the competitive European economy. The 
AKP’s government passed the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th harmonization packages within two 
years, to July 2004. The reforms presented by the harmonization packages included 
increased powers for the civilian bureaucracy vis – a – vis the state elites, the abolition of 
the death penalty and State Security Courts, more space for freedom of expression and 
organization. The EU commission approved these harmonization packages in October 
2004 and Turkey was declared a candidate to start the process of negotiations for full 
membership.
119
   
After the year 2005 there was an obvious decline in Turkish enthusiasm 
towards westernization and EU membership which affected the reform process. 
The matter of Turkey’s identity became an obstacle with German and French 
insistence to keep the Christian nature of EU members which would, Merkel and 
Sarkozu argued, be threatened by the entrance of a country with a Muslim 
majority like Turkey  led by Islamists in their point of view. This was also 
reflected in the decline of public support for EU membership among Turks. 
IV.2.2 The use of soft power: 
The term “soft power” embeds a country's ability to influence events through 
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persuasion  
and attraction, rather than military or financial coercion. In other words, the country has 
more soft power if its culture, values and institutions incite admiration and respect in 
other parts of the world.  For example, diplomacy and a nation’s standing in international 
bodies enable it to build alliances and serve its national interests.
120
 
Different elements can play a role in a state’s soft power such as culture, 
education, arts, film, poetry, literature, print and visual media, architecture, higher 
education, NGOs, science and technology, tourism, diplomacy and the political system.  
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the global context went towards the emphasis on         
“securitization” and the importance of hard power represented in fighting terror through 
military means. This, however, was the very context in which Turkey preferred to place 
emphasis on democratization and the state’s soft power. 121 
From public diplomacy, education, arts , media , sciences, foreign policy and 
economy emerged Turkey’s  potential and active role in the region, taking into 
consideration its history and geography as well as global transformations. The post-11 
September era witnessed the emergence of new actors that influence regional systems 
such as international courts, media, public opinion, human rights organizations and non – 
governmental organizations. Thus, this pushed the global system to be more dynamic, 
multidimensional and less controllable. Turkey’s shift thus corresponded to a greater shift 
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at the global level
122
 
In this context, an opportunity for Turkish intellectuals was provided to develop 
their own concepts and theories and to see the world from a non –Eurocentric 
perspective, as evidenced in Davutoglu’s “ Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International 
Position” with its focus on soft power. One can argue that a main pillar of Turkey’s soft 
power lies in its democratic experience which has helped in positioning the country as a 
global actor and was an inspiration for emerging social and political movements in the 
region especially the Arab World, with its radical transformations and popular struggle 
beginning in early 2011.
123
 Here too the explanatory value of constructivism is patent. 
Negative perceptions of Turkey at the international level were the result of policies 
pursued by successive Turkish governments such as extra – judicial killings, torture in 
prisons, human right abuses, suppression of freedom of thought and expression. Over the 
past decade, the country has been able to change this image and the world now focuses 
more on Turkey’s social change and economic development and new foreign policy. 
Here, the importance of public diplomacy as strategic communication tool to understand, 
inform and influence the public is very important and the “story of Turkey” was the result 
of successfully using this tool a significant one from east to west.
124
 
In other words, Turkey managed to preserve its conservative values as it entered 
the 21
th
 century with high dynamism abandoning the calculations of the Cold War era in 
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which relations and role are determined by the tensions of the polarized world system, 
and adopting a new vision that is based on its own geographical and historical 
background. Thus, Turkey was able to fuse traditional Islamic – Ottoman culture with 
socio- economic modernization.
125
 
Turkey started to have a more active foreign policy in the surrounding regions 
aiming to have a leadership role in it. However, in some regions like Balkans and Central 
Asia the leadership role was limited in contrast to the Middle East. Therefore, the Middle 
East including North Africa became a major arena for Turkish foreign policy during the 
last decade but at the same time it pursued its humanitarian interventions and peace – 
keeping role in Afghanistan and Balkans. 
Resolving the Kurdish dilemma through soft power was the aim of the AKP when 
it first governed the country. For the military, the Kurdish issue is about terrorism but the 
AKP realized that the rise of democratic standards in Turkey depends on the resolution of 
the Kurdish issue. The resolution of this issue depends on the rise of democratic 
standards. After 2007, the military’s monopoly over the Kurdish issue was ended, and 
this helped the AKP to expand its sphere of action. The military is currently able to have 
a word over the Kurdish issue only to the extent that the civilian government allows 
it. Moreover, more than half of the Kurds are natural supporters of the AKP which 
promotes a civilian resolution instead of a military resolution. The ruling party clearly 
stated that the policy of forced assimilation is off the table. Moreover, it creates an 
economic attraction for the Kurds that is to integrate them with the rest of Turkey. This 
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situation isn’t widely accepted by the PKK as it started to lose the Kurdish ground to the 
AKP.
126
 Paradoxically, things are going back to square one, taking into consideration the 
complications of the surrounding countries facing troubles such as Syria. The recent 
upsurge in fighting with the PKK caused by the latter’s ambushes of Turkish soldiers 
seems to reopening the door to the use of power and a reassessment, for this particular 
problem, of soft power strategies.  
The Middle East and Turkish soft power: 
Turkish soft power was deployed in the Middle East at many levels during the 
past few years especially in media and foreign policy. 
Concerning media, Turkey, like many other countries that broadcast TV and radio 
channels in Arabic to the Arab world such as Russia, Great Britain ,Iran and the USA,  
established direct communications with the Arab countries in April 2010 when the 
Arabic-language service of the TRT, TRT Arapça, began broadcasting, although it is still 
not as powerful as those of other countries in term of celebrity  among a Middle Eastern 
audience because of its novelty. On the other hand, the audience for Turkish TV series in 
the Arab world is very high and one series titled Noor (Gümüş) reached an Arab audience 
of 85 million, while another, Under the Lime Trees, known to the Arab audience as Al-
Awraq Al-Motasaqeta - (Ihlamurlar Altında), has 67 million Arab viewers. Though Noor 
was the first Turkish TV series to enter the Arab world, a total of 42 series have now 
done so. Turkish TV series along with Turkish policies towards the Middle East have all 
helped make Turkey an important tourist destination for the Arab countries. Visitors to 
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Turkey in 2002 from the Arab countries numbered 975,000, but by 2010, this figure had 
risen to 3.6 million. The percentage of citizens of Middle Eastern countries within the 
total number of visitors rose in the same period from 7.3% to 12.6%.
127
 
The Turkish echo in the Middle East found unexpected support in the Turkish 
cinema and music industries. In addition to the above – mentioned TV series, Turkish 
music, movies, and other television programs have become instant hits in Arab societies; 
the finale of the Turkish TV series Noor was watched by approximately twenty-one 
million Arab viewers in 2009.  They were heavily impressed by the alternative films and 
videos provided in term of how predominantly Muslim societies can live, illustrating 
increased societal freedoms—especially in the case of Turkish women—and higher living 
standards, thanks to the Turkish liberalized economy.
128
 One can speculate that these 
initiating spectacles probably played a role in predisposing Arab peoples to revolt against 
their repressive regimes.  
In the field of foreign policy, the Turkish relations with neighbors  progressed 
positively to a certain extent in light of the “zero problem policy” pursued under the AKP 
and Turkey’s ambition to play a major role in the region. For Turkey the Middle East can 
be divided into three parts: the Arab World, Israel and Iran. During the first years of AKP 
rule a pro – European policy was pursued. Greater emphasis on Turkey’s regional 
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relations was considered later on. As for countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria which had 
hostile relations with Turkey in the past, relations transformed dramatically under the 
AKP. Economic relations and investments played a major role in this rapprochement. In 
2000 Turkey exported $184 million to Syria, whereas in 2010 the figure had leaped to  
$1.6 billion. Meanwhile the Turkish exports to Iraq have mushroomed from $829 million 
in 2003 to over $ 6 billion in 2010.
129
 
After the second AKP victory in the 2007 elections, having consolidated its 
position at home, they found an opportunity to set new foreign policy priorities taking 
into consideration the changing regional circumstances and popularity of the zero 
problem policy. As found in the constructivist paradigm, which thus refutes neorealist 
structuralism, classical realist rigid Hobbesianism and neo-liberal market reification, 
foreign and international affairs slowly rotate and develop, based on profound (re-) 
construction of identities, economies and polities.  
Thus, the zero problem policy was a serious attempt to diversify all possible 
relations especially economic and diplomatic ones with all surrounding states. The 
government began with Iraq, where Turkey brought about a change in relations with 
Kurdish parties in Northern Iraq. Commercial ties expanded in spite of frozen diplomatic 
relations with Iraqi Kurdistan, in the hopes that a chance would ultimately be offered of a 
peaceful solution.
130
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Iranian- Turkish relations had been tense during the 1990s because of Turkish 
claims that Iran was helping the PKK by permitting it to use Iranian territories as camps 
for their attacks on Turkey, and Iranian claims that Turkey was providing shelter to 
Mujahedeen Al-Khalk, who aimed to overthrow the Khomeini regime in Iran. Hostile 
relations peaked in 1999 when the countries went to the brink of war due to Turkish 
bombing of some PKK targets within the Iranian borders. Tensions decreased thereafter 
somewhat, but after 2002 relations became multidimensional with more focus on 
economic and diplomatic issues.
131
 
Regarding the Iranian nuclear program and in particular, uranium enrichment, 
Turkey opposed the aggressiveness of the US and EU, adopting an intermediate position, 
offering to mediate between Iran and the West, yet convincing Iran to abandon its 
ambitions. However, the AKP government believed in the value of a historically – based 
good neighborhood policy and promised to oppose any Western attack on Iran. This was 
followed by active diplomatic initiatives with official exchanges of visits between the 
leaderships of the countries, such as the official visit of Ahmadinajad in 2008 in which he 
met Erdogan and Gul and during which the Turkish tune regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program was softened and Turkey declared that it would not oppose Iran’s production of 
nuclear energy for civilian purposes. In 2010 Erdogan visited Iran with the president of 
Brazil Lula Da Silva for an agreement on the import of enriched uranium to Turkey. This 
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time, Erdogan gave a speech denouncing Israel’s nuclear program and the countries’ 
mediation efforts failed primarily because of Western opposition.
132
 
Relations with Syria also improved during the first years of the AKP rule after a period of 
tense relations that ended in 1999 with the signing of the Adana agreement, calling for 
cooperation of the two countries in security and military matters followed by other trade 
and military agreements as well as the exchange of high level official visits. 
Bilateral relations entered a honeymoon under the AKP with Erdogan referring to 
the Syrians as “brothers” in some speeches even as trade relations developed 
significantly. Turkish-Syrian trade increased, from $824.1 million in 2003 to $1.84 
billion in 2010. In 2011 alone, Turkish companies invested a total of $223 million in the 
Syrian metal, food, cement, and open sea fishing industries. In addition, there was a 
considerable increase in the number of Syrian tourists visiting Turkey, up from 154,000 
in 2003 to 500,000 in 2010 while the abolition of visa requirements for visits shorter than 
ninety days undoubtedly played a role in the success of both tourism and trade.
133
 
Meanwhile, Turkey played a mediator role between neighboring countries and Syria, 
including Lebanon and Israel. In this context, Israel sent a secret message to Syria 
through Turkey in June 2007 in which Israel asked Damascus to take some constructive 
steps toward peace in return for Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In addition, 
when Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, Erdogan sent Davutoglu to 
Damascus at Olmert and President George Bush's request to ask that Assad use his 
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influence on Hezbollah. Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora sought the help of Ankara 
to convince Damascus and Tehran to abandon their politically destabilizing strategies 
toward Lebanon. Although these efforts apparently failed, the fact that they were 
undertaken at all indicates a role for Turkey hitherto not contemplated within the Middle 
East's various conflicts.
134
 
The bilateral ties were turning into personal ones between Erdogan and Bashar 
Al-Assad and future expectations for these relations were promising until the Arab 
uprisings in early 2011. Turkish – Syrian relations were best explained by Abdullah Gul’s 
proclamation that Turkey’s trust in the Syrian government had vanished as a result of the 
massacres committed by the Syrian regime against its own people. Ankara revealed in 
late 2011 that it was preparing targeted sanctions against Damascus, which might include 
a buffer zone on Syrian territory in addition to its support for  the Syrian resistance and 
its acceptance to host thousands of Syrian refugees in areas bordering Syria. These events 
ended the zero problems approach pursued by Turkey towards Syria and after a 10-year 
honeymoon; Turkish-Syrian relations are back to square one.
135
 
Lebanon was also the object of Turkish activism in the Middle East. According to 
Davutoglu instability in Lebanon would affect the whole Middle East. In other words, 
any intervention in Lebanese affairs on behalf of one group usually leads to the 
intervention of regional and global actors, which in turn results in transforming the 
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domestic crisis into a regional and global one.
136
 Economic relations were as usual a 
priority for Turkey. The volume of trade between the countries increased from around a 
quarter million dollars in 2003 to more than a billion dollars in 2008.
137
 Turkey had 
intensified its diplomatic relations with Lebanon in the early 2000s and the Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri was invited to Turkey in 2004 before being assassinated. 
In Lebanon too, Turkey tried its band at mediation. The Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006 
was a milestone in Turkish engagement. Turkey condemned the Israeli attacks and 
endeavored to achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible. After the end of the war in 2006 , 
Turkey participated in the reconstruction of Lebanon, donating around 50 Million 
dollars.
138
   
Away from the Arab world, Turkey made positive steps towards a rapprochement 
with Cyprus and Georgia under the “zero problems” logo. A remarkable rapprochement 
was achieved in relations with Russia and Caucasian neighbors, taking into consideration 
economic and security matters.
139
   
In summary, Turkey under the AKP entered a new phase in transforming rigid 
relations with neighboring counties into active ones through following a win –win 
strategy in which both sides would benefit from cooperation. And the old and new 
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hostilities were tackled in a different manner in which the emphasis was placed on the 
collective benefits to be gained by all regional actors as a result of increased regional 
stability. 
Turkish soft power and the zero problem policy pursued since 2002 is now facing 
a crucial test in light of the Arab uprisings in which Turkey took sides in favor of the 
people, which affected its relations with regimes, when these survived, most notably in 
Syria. It remains to be seen how the crisis in Syria and in Syrian – Turkish relations 
develops. This is of the most importance, for Syria is an essential bridge to much of the 
rest of the Arab World and the Middle East. But the Turkish leadership has gambled that 
the strategy, in the longer term, is a winning one. 
IV.2.3 A more independent foreign policy: 
During the Cold War Turkish foreign policy lived in the shadow of Western 
policy, especially that of the US, creating a negative image in the minds of Middle 
Eastern countries which Turkey saw as the poodle of the West in the region and a 
strategic ally for USA and Israel, something which precluded Turkish initiatives in the 
Middle East. This image was transformed as a result of Turkish – American tension over 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the firm stance taken towards the Israeli siege and 
onslaught of Gaza in 2008. 
Changing political discourse with USA and Israel: 
Regarding relations with the USA, these were affected by Turkish policy shifts 
towards the Middle East in particular and the region in general. The milestone in bilateral 
relations was the refusal of the Turkish parliament to allow U.S. troops to use the Turkish 
territory in their invasion of Iraq in March 2003, a decision taken under the pressure of 
the Turkish grassroots and public opinion. This led to greater trust in the Arab World as a 
whole and a gradually increased willingness to trust Turkish initiatives throughout the 
area.  
  As a gesture to placate the U.S, Ankara offered to send 20,000 Turkish troops to 
help reconstruction. The U.S did not agree, and took little notice of Turkish anxieties 
regarding Northern Iraq. Turkey also demanded 92 billion dollars in compensation for the 
harm done by the Iraq War to the Turkish economy. The Bush administration also 
ignored this request.
140  
At this moment the USA realized that it could no longer take Turkish support for 
granted. Relations were thus strained but far from broken, reflecting the now complicated 
nature of bilateral relations, and notably the ambiguous perception of political Islam in 
Washington. 
In addition, Turkish – US relations continued to face challenges in light of 
Turkish support for aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, and Turkey’s “NO” vote on 
sanctions against Iran at the United Security Council, as well as Turkish support of the 
Palestinian cause. Turkey continues to recognize the importance role of relations with the 
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U.S, but through the political, economic, and identification changes noted here, it 
displays far greater confidence in its choices.  
Turkey and the U.S have a series of long – term common interests which mark the 
limits of disagreement, including: NATO, EU, War on terrorism, Economic 
concerns.
141
The rational choice for U.S policymakers, which they seem to have made, is 
to argue each of its cases, in the hopes that a self- confident and rather successful Turkish 
government will come around, within the limits imposed by the Turkish government in 
the form of soft power and the quest to minimize problems with the states of the region.  
Turkish – Israeli relations went through ups and downs under the AKP affected 
by the Palestinian issue in particular. In November 2007, a meeting between the Israeli 
president Simon Peres and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas took place in Turkey, 
seen then as a regional mediator. Relations dramatically deteriorated after the Israeli war 
on the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009 and even before that when Khalid Mashal visited Ankara 
and met with Abdulah Gul. Turkish relations with Hamas under the AKP improved 
greatly, something the AKP justified by Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006 and the 
perceived necessity of including Hamas in the quest for an end to the Palestinian- Israeli 
conflict.
142
 
On January 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan strongly condemned Israeli 
aggression against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the Davos Conference and in 
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the presence of Simon Peres. In June 2010, the Flotilla incident further strained relations 
and led to the freezing of diplomatic ties, as nine Turkish activists were killed by Israeli 
soldiers while trying to break the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, 
the Israeli government refused to apologize for the killing but softened the blockade 
slightly under international pressure.
143
   
Moving away from the “zero problems policy”, Erdogan was following public 
support of the Palestinian issue and this succeeded in raising the public image of Erdogan 
and Turkey in the Middle East. Improving Turkish relations with Middle East was also an 
indication for Israel that Turkey was following an Islamization agenda, a matter that 
contributed to worsening relations. 
144
  
In conclusion, the Turkish foreign policy during the last decade has been 
undergoing dramatic changes in which Turkey has started to estimate its real potential 
and power especially at the regional level, keeping in mind that Turkey is one of the 
secular, democratic and pro-Western countries with a Muslim majority. Changes in 
foreign policy were linked to the transformation of identity based on social, economic 
and political shifts domestically, rather than simply an adaptation to a transformed 
international system. Turkey’s greater self- confidence, linked to greater power and 
wealth it is true, made it possible for the AKP to adopt a policy of equidistance from all 
foreign actors, the current crisis in relations with Syria notwithstanding. Continuing 
international issues, notably Palestine and Iran, also suggest limitations to the 
construction of a new Turkish posture internationally.    
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A proper understanding of the transformation of Turkey’s standing in the world-
order over the last decade needs also to take into account global events, starting from the 
end of the Cold War, 11 September 2001, the American “war on terror”, and the financial 
crisis. The Syrian crisis represents another major rupture for Turkey, placing the Turkish 
soft power predilection under momentary threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
One decade after the first elections won by the AKP and its accession to power, 
Turkey’s internal, regional and international politics have changed dramatically, with 
significant results in terms of the enhancement of the country’s position. Through its 
three electoral victories, the party was able to achieve impressive results, measured in 
terms of economic growth despite a global crisis, and its refusal to sign an agreement 
with the IMF. This realism in internal affairs, combined with pragmatic decisions, made 
success possible, and show that the idea that an Islamic link did nothing to limit the 
capacity of the AKP to act as a political, a highly political party, increasing its share of 
the vote through three successive elections. In foreign affairs, the AKP transformed the 
country into a major regional power, again through a proactive, pragmatic, non-
ideological approach to its partners, with whom it wished to work towards a zero 
problem” relationship. In keeping with requirements for EU admission, which the AKP 
continues to pursue, although not always with the same amount of enthusiasm, one of the 
interests of Turkey in foreign relations has been that governments of the region be 
receptive to the demands of their peoples. When clearly this was not the case, particularly 
beginning in 2011, Erdogan and his ministers did not hesitate to support the replacement 
of an existing region, as was seen in Libya, Egypt and Syria. At the same time, the 
Turkish government has been unwilling to use force and has relied on techniques related 
to soft, as opposed to hard power. All of this seems to have appealed to the population, 
because of its combination of nationalist and conservative yet forward-looking elements. 
The “Turkish model” has thus emerged rapidly, and has proven attractive to states 
in the region and beyond. The particular combination of conservatism mixed with 
liberalism in the economic sphere and certain elements of modernization appeared to 
show that a pragmatic discourse is compatible with the ideological roots of the AKP, and 
makes it possible for it to rule a country which continues to be secular in its institutions 
and its recent practices. Erdogan, it should not be forgotten, was once imprisoned for a 
poem judged anti-secular, has managed to become one of the most popular politicians in 
the largely Islamic Middle East, including the Arab world.  
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How was this degree of openness and development achieved in such a relatively 
short time under the rule of a party labeled “Islamist”? The application of constructivism 
as a theoretical paradigm enables us to understand this. First of all, the element of change 
is part of the constructivist perspective. The AKP learned from the trials and errors of its 
predecessors, especially the Welfare Party. It learned quickly from its own mistakes. Its 
members understood that the military council would never tolerate an explicitly religious 
party, although it could not easily object to the ideological inspirations of the AKP. It will 
be recalled that a particular group of reformists within the National View Movement 
(NVM) decided that the road to success required a shift in political discourse. Thus, from 
the 1970s on, the long road to change was undertaken. The reformist leadership labeled 
itself conservative rather than Islamist, and proved themselves persuasive over time. 
They also understood that the quest for EU membership, supported by a large majority of 
the population and the elites, would have as an important side effect the weakening of the 
military, stronghold of Kemalism, since  this corresponded to European prerequisites for 
membership. The application was wanted in itself and pursued also as a tactic in internal 
politics. By the time the AKP had been formed, the transformation needed for success 
had been achieved, and this strategic transformation resulted in genuine changes in the 
party and the electorate which made it possible to maintain power once it had been 
achieved, and render impossible a new coup d’état by the military, which was now on the 
defensive. The democratic system required by the AKP to ensure success and by the EU 
for purposes of membership, helped to promote Islamic social and political forces to the 
level of legitimate players even as Turkish political life opened up and liberties became a 
routine part of political life in Turkey.  
The AKP had also understood that the citizens would not welcome any kind of 
aggressive confrontation with the secular state and preferred a moderate political party 
working to achieve domestic reforms, including of course religious (and not only 
political) freedoms, particularly if prosperity was to be part of the formula. All of these 
mechanisms are to an extent predicted in the constructivist model, which combines 
political economy and cultural transformations in its explanation for the posture of states 
domestically and internationally, refusing to place the society in the fixed context of a 
static structure, the international system.  
In short, the AKP’s journey from Islamists to conservative democrats was a result 
of a long political adaptation process in which respect for the Turkish secular red lines 
and the embracing of a pragmatic program were the main lessons. Moreover, the 
interaction between the party and surrounding social changes as well as an evolving 
international environment led to a change in the party’s attitude and self definition. At the 
same time, Turkish voters were tempted by the AKP’s emphasis on issues directly related 
to the standard of living and improved social services, most particularly in the health and 
housing sectors. Dealing with people’s daily concerns rather than abstract ideological 
matters helped the AKP gain the public trust. The party was seen as focusing mainly on 
problem identification and problem solving. Once again, a strategic consideration became 
a formula for success and then a genuine characteristic of the ruling party and of the 
policies it pursued. The economic success which they registered over the years was most 
certainly the principal cause of their repeated and growing political success, and this can 
be seen as a matter of luck, or of design. In either case, it contributed significantly to the 
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construction of an image, a policy, and thus, a changed country which strongly attracted 
and influenced the policies of Turkey’s neighbors as well.  
In other words, the AKP with its sometimes ultra-liberal policies was able to take 
advantage of the economic and political situation and successfully managed the economic 
crisis politically which impressed the Turkish voters.  
Third of all, after a long period of Kemalist suppression of aspects of collective 
identity, the society was ready for change of some sort. At the same time, this change 
brought with it renewed polarization and debate. The AKP, through this polarization, 
appears to have emerged at least for the moment, as that party which shows greatest 
respect for the multilayered and complex nature of Turkish identity. The long suppression 
of political Islam and Islamists is perhaps what in the end provided the AKP with the 
understanding, the tools, the adaptability and the political wisdom to win the necessary 
combination of credibility and legitimacy which made possible their accession to power 
and the maintenance thereof.  
It has been pointed out that “democracy involves a process of trial and error,” a 
joint learning experience. It has also been indicated that “through a painful experience 
and impasse those who hope to win everything understood that the possibility of winning 
something is better than winning nothing. The Turkish experience noted here supports 
these views.”145 
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Finally, the transformation of the international context after the end of the cold 
war provided a global, then a regional environment in which the emerging social, 
economic cultural and political factors at work within various levels of the society could 
emerge as a renewed force, a new and dynamic construct.  
Political Islam, it is known, comes in a variety of forms. It is now seen that these 
forms and the environment in which they exist, are subject to change, sometimes slow 
and otherwise rapid. Each experience is particular, one might even say unique, and based 
on the specific context in which they operate. It can be seen with the example of the AKP 
that what we are talking about is politics and not a reified form of “Islam”, and this 
changes the picture, making Islamists appear as less a threat to their secular counterparts 
and more as normal players of the political game.
146
 Their inclusion in the political 
system opens a way for them to become moderate and for Turkey to go forward in the 
consolidation of democracy.
147
 The constructivist paradigm conceives international 
relations as a series of evolving pyramids (representing states), in which transformations 
at the deepest, economic and identitarian levels of a social formation, and their gradual 
but solid eruption at the regional and global level, bring about willed transformations. In 
this view, we are no longer prisoners of the rigid structures of human nature, the market 
or the international system posited by realism, neo-realism and liberalism, nor is one 
limited by the abstract and formalistic prescriptions of institutionalism. Constructivism, 
with its emphasis on the slow, tortuous and complex transformation of domestic and 
                                                          
146
 - Mohamad Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, ( Ann 
Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2008)                                                                                                          
https:/ /www.csidonline.org/.../Mohammed_Ayoob_CSID_paper.pdf 
147
 - Zeyneb İmisiker, the Changing Nature of Islamism in Turkey, 2. 
95 
 
 
 
international social identities, is never far away in attempting to explain what remains one 
of the most extraordinary transformations of the past half century, that of Turkey in the 
early twentieth century. 
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